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EDITORIAL
PPE Development and Needs in HMA
by Andy Smith [ University of Genoa ]

Left to right, the image shows flechettes from a munition, pre-chopped fragments from a bounding fragmentation mine, and prescored diamond fragmentation from a submunition.
Image courtesy of the author.

A

s written in the International Mine Action

hardened, polycarbonate can flex in a way that has often pre-

Standards (IMAS) 10.30 on personal protective

vented the blast front and associated tiny pieces of mine casing

equipment (PPE), “the primary means of prevent-

and unburned explosive from blinding the wearers.

ing explosive injury in the workplace is by the supervised use

It is fragmentation that causes most fatal injuries during de-

of demining tools and processes that reduce the likelihood of

mining. Fragmentation may come from the munition, from

an unintended detonation.” The IMAS goes on to state that

the soil and stones surrounding it, or tiny pieces of the explo-

PPE “should be the final protective measure after all planning,

sive charge itself. Unsurprisingly, the most damaging kind of

training and procedural efforts to reduce risk have been tak-

fragmentation is deliberately built into the munition either by

en.” To date the “final protective measure” has been to provide

designing a casing that fragments or by surrounding the ex-

PPE that is practical but that does not provide full protection.

plosive charge with fragments of metal, some of which may be

The threat posed by the blast wave(s) associated with the

shaped to be self-orientating and especially penetrating.

detonation of high or low explosive is highly dependent on

There are several reasons why the fragmentation threat to

the quantity of explosive involved. With small blast mines,

deminers has not been addressed despite the fact that even

the speed of the blast front (as the volume of gas expands) rap-

small fragmentation devices have regularly killed deminers

idly declines and many deminers wearing no protection on

wearing PPE.

their bodies have suffered no body injury despite being very

1. To provide reliable protection against fragments by in-

close during accidents. The evidence from the Database of

creasing the layers of flexible armor or by adding hard

Demining Accidents (DDAS) is that body armor serves little

armor panels would increase weight dramatically. This

proven purpose when the accident involves a small blast mine

would make the wearer uncomfortable and restrict mo-

unless the deminer’s hand-tool breaks up and becomes part of

bility in a way that could increase the risk of an accident

the hazard. In any close-quarter blast involving kilograms of

occurring. Experience indicates that it would also in-

explosive, the disruptive blast forces can pass through body

crease the risk of the PPE not being worn at all.

armor and pulverize the cells of the wearer almost as effec-

2. Effective fragmentation armor would have to be ex-

tively as if the armor were not there. Polycarbonate blast vi-

tended to protect the arms and legs because the spray

sors are also of no proven use in a large blast but are useful

of fragments is not confined to the torso. The improved

against small blasts. As long as the material is not deliberately

armor would also have to cover the face and head, but

ISSUE 21.1 @ APRIL 2018
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The images show combat body armor with a V50 of 450 m/s and a helmet after being struck by fragments from a PROM-1 bounding
fragmentation mine. The deminer suffered multiple penetrations to torso, arms, and head and bled out rapidly.
Images courtesy of the author.

effective transparent visor material that could match

also has a shaped charge designed to penetrate armored steel,

the protection of body armor is not available, so this is

which nothing short of well-spaced layers of armored steel or

not possible.

reactive armor panels can stop close-up.

3. The much increased costs would mean that demining

Whatever PPE is issued, the informed deminer knows

organizations could not afford to do as much actual de-

that it cannot provide real protection against a worst case

mining—and controlling the risks faced by deminers

scenario, but that does not mean that we should not be try-

has to be balanced against the risks being faced by the

ing to improve PPE so that it can provide effective protec-

population who are waiting for them to arrive.

tion more often.

Reasons one and two are based on the premise that any pro-

The third reason for not improving PPE—increased cost—

tection is only as good as its weakest point. To provide torso

is unsound because failure to do “all that is reasonable” to

protection able to stop the fragments while leaving the wear-

protect the workers could end up costing the employer far

er’s arms or face unprotected is inconsistent and illogical. This

more than the cost of better PPE. In the author’s experience,

is true, but it is not a good reason not to increase protection

most donors of HMA are open to requests for support to pro-

where we can because the PPE we provide is already incon-

vide better PPE for those doing the work they fund.

sistent. The current IMAS requirement for body armor is a
NATO STANAG V50 of 450 m/s while the face and eye pro-

Why Have There Been No Significant Improvements?

tection is 5 mm polycarbonate, which has a NATO STANAG

There have been improvements to demining PPE over the past

V50 of less than half of that.1,2 The V50 is the speed at which

twenty years, but most have been incremental. One example is

half of the fragments (50 percent) compromise the protection.
So how can we justify requiring torso protection that is far
greater than for the face? The answer is that it is not logical,
but it was the best we could do when this part of the IMAS
was written.
There is always a balance to be drawn between what is practical and what is ideal. In humanitarian mine action (HMA),
we have rarely pursued the ideal because whatever we do must
be practical. This is seen as being realistic because many of the
hazards we confront simply cannot be protected against with
any PPE currently available.
For example, this KB1 submunition contains only 30 g of
high explosive that produces an expanding blast front that is
relatively easy to protect against at 30 cm. It also has a fragmentation body with steel ball bearings encased in a nylon body that most body armor used in HMA could stop at
a distance of a meter, even if the visor could not. However, it

6
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KB1 submission.
Image courtesy of the author.

The images show the lighter blast visor and the ROFI face mask.5,6
Images courtesy of the author.

the availability of lighter body armor materials with a tight-

The industry needs a PPE testing regime that provides a rele-

er weave that allows higher levels of protection to be achieved

vant means of comparing one PPE product with another. The

in a garment of the same weight, or more of the wearer to be

only test we currently have is the NATO STANAG 2920 test,

covered without a weight increase. The design of a lighter vi-

which was designed to provide a comparable measure of the

sor and some improved hand tools have also been incremental

protection offered against bullets and fragments in a combat

improvements.3 The ROFI demining face mask is the only truly

scenario. To this end, the STANAG testing regime involves fir-

novel advance because it makes use of a very lightweight lami-

ing single, carefully shaped and weighed fragments of a very

nate named PURE, but its design has been criticized and it is not

hard metal directly down a barrel toward the material at pre-

widely used.4

cisely measured speeds. The test is repeated at least six times

Changes to demining PPE over the last twenty years have
been largely minor for three reasons.

with each strike well separated from the others. The result is
calculated as a V50 in meters or feet per second.

1. Lack of demand. There is a general absence of an ex-

Almost every part of the STANAG test is inappropriate to

pressed wish for better PPE from the end users or their

use when appraising demining PPE. When an explosive haz-

managers.

ard detonates in front of a deminer, the PPE is struck by a blast

2. The current risk is thought tolerable. A generally low

front, which the test does nothing to replicate. It is also struck

level of accidents has led many involved in demining to

by fragments of the ground and parts of the munition’s cas-

consider the current level of risk to be tolerable.

ing and/or deliberate fragments inside it. It may be struck by

3. There are more immediate ways to manage risk.

multiple fragments that are bunched closely together or fol-

Managing risk by making improvements to procedures

lowing one after another. The fragments are not of a strict-

is known to be effective at preventing injury, so efforts

ly controlled hardness, shape, and weight and have not been

in that direction are more likely to yield immediate

fired from a barrel. Even the pre-shaped fragments in frag-

benefits.

mentation munitions tumble in the air, which usually makes
them much easier to stop than a directed projectile moving at

Lack of Demand

the same velocity. However, the explosions that launch these

Although deminers rarely ask for better PPE, that may be be-

fragments can generate a brief heat of over 4,000 degrees

cause they often believe that the PPE they have provides great-

Celsius (e.g., TNT) and some heat is transferred to the frag-

er protection than it does or that nothing better is available.

ments, which can become hot enough to damage the material

ISSUE 21.1 @ APRIL 2018
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and this is a level of risk that is unavoidable and
“accepted in a given context.”10 When conflict is over,
people often become accustomed to living with a
higher level of risk than would be tolerated elsewhere.
It is inappropriate for any humanitarian demining
organization to adopt the high-risk mindset that may
prevail in an insecure post-conflict context because
it is the current humanitarian values in peaceful and
secure societies that should apply. These are the values
that those paying for humanitarian mine action want
to promote as part of supporting a sustainable peace.
There are large holes penetrating this body armor material, which has
burned and shrunk away from hot fragments from a bounding mine.
The material had a NATO STANAG 2920 V50 in excess of 450 m/s.
Image courtesy of DDAS.

Throughout the history of HMA, the high level of
risk that is tolerated where we work has been used to
justify using lower levels of PPE than is acceptable during such activities as range clearance and explosive

they strike by melting or burning it. It is true that much of

ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks in Europe and America. Early

the kinetic energy in any projectile is converted to heat when

demining PPE was inadequate and ranged from industrial

it is obliged to stop rapidly, but some fragments generated by

safety spectacles to combat armor and purpose-designed al-

mines and explosive ordnance start off hot, a fact that makes

beit minimal protection.
The requirements of the IMAS published in 2001 went

some PPE materials shrink away from them.
In 2007, a European Workshop Agreement resulted in

some way to level that playing field but did not bring stan-

the publication of a test protocol for demining PPE that was

dards up to those used in civil EOD work in Europe and the

referenced in IMAS 10.30 in 2008 but was quickly found

United States, because those drafting the IMAS, including

An

the author, deemed that impractical. However, if we could re-

attempt to create a better European agreement was started

duce the number of deminer injuries and/or the severity of

to be unfit for purpose and quietly removed in 2010.

7,8

by the Royal Military Academy (RMA) in Belgium as part

their injuries, it is an obligation for any humanitarian or-

of the TIRAMISU project in 2016 but was not completed.9

ganization to do so because we must do “everything reason-

One feature of the planned test was the use of a triple-barrel

able” to manage and reduce risk of injury to our employees.

fragment launcher so that the effect of near simultaneous

So the current risk is only tolerable if we can show that we

fragment strikes could be measured. There would still be

have done everything reasonable to manage and mitigate risk

no way of recording the heat of the fragment during flight,

and show that we have done this in a way that would sat-

but this would be an advance because some armor materials

isfy a court of law. Some international demining insurance

cannot withstand multiple simultaneous impacts as
well as others.
The Current Risk is Thought Tolerable
The definition of tolerable risk in the IMAS is “risk
which is accepted in a given context based on current values of society.”10 This is taken directly from
the definition used by the International Standards
Organization (ISO) and was designed to apply across
all industries, not specifically those dealing with explosive hazards in countries that lack the means to clear
the hazards themselves. Every industry is intended to
interpret that definition appropriately in their own
working context.
The level of risk that people live with during conflict
is usually higher than it would be during peacetime,

8
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The image shows the RMA’s triple fragment launcher for testing PPE
with near-simultaneous strikes.
Image courtesy of Georgios Kechagiadakis and Marc Pirlot.

Left to right, the images show demining PPE used in Mozambique and Cambodia in 1997.11
Images courtesy of the author.

providers insist that the minimum level of PPE required in

information becomes known. The Lebanon Mine Action

the IMAS is used, which implies that the IMAS level of PPE

Centre determines the level of risk that is tolerable at

is broadly accepted as being reasonable, but PPE is only the

any task. In the event of disagreement, the final arbiters

final protective measure after all other reasonable means of

of what is ‘all reasonable effort’ shall be the Government

managing risk have been taken.
The definition of tolerable risk in the current edition of the
National Mine Action Standards in Lebanon includes examples that may be useful to others:13
“…The ‘tolerable risk‘ remaining after an area has been
searched, cleared and released is the risk of explosive
hazards being beneath the required search depth in
that task area. The ‘tolerable risk’ to demining staff
is the risk remaining after all reasonable efforts have
been made to train, equip and supervise staff in the
conduct of inherently safe demining procedures. All
reasonable effort includes the production of a formal

and Courts of Justice in Lebanon.”14

There Are More Immediate Ways to Manage Risk
Dramatic progress has been made in risk avoidance over
the past twenty years. One breakthrough came because of advances in metal detector technology, which meant that many
hazards with a minimum-metal content could be reliably located. Another was the use of small radio-controlled machines
to process areas with fragmentation mines before the deminers deployed.15 Then came the use of long-handled rakes for excavation that used distance to avoid injury when there was an
anti-personnel blast mine detonation. Today, there is the in-

task risk assessment designed to ensure that appropriate

creasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) with high-

measures to mitigate risk are taken. All formal risk

resolution cameras that are able to hover and allow the remote

assessments must be updated as work progresses and new

inspection of potential hazards before anyone approaches.

The images show the PPE currently being used by a demining organization clearing improvised explosive devices (IED) in Syria. In
the author’s opinion, they are doing everything reasonable to protect their workers both with PPE and with specialist IED training.
Images courtesy of MAT Kosovo.12
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Images from a small unmanned aircraft (SUA) show the extent of structural damage, then close-up views of visible suspicious
items.
Images courtesy of field operatives in Syria.

In the example above in Raqqah, Syria, in February 2018,

frequent. As a result, catastrophic damage to hands and eyes

a preliminary camera overview helped to identify access

are now by far the most common severe injuries. Meanwhile,

routes and make informed decisions about approaches that

fragmentation injuries still cause the most deaths.

minimized risk to the workers. The skilled pilot then used

Although there have been no significant advances in dem-

the camera to look through doorways and windows and

ining PPE over the past twenty years, there has been a reduc-

could identify a passive infrared (PIR) triggered IED (in the

tion in the IMAS PPE requirement.16 The original 2001 IMAS

cardboard box with the sensor protruding) before anyone

10.30 PPE requirements included the provision of frontal

approached. The small unmanned aircraft (SUA) gave the or-

throat protection and the wearing of a full-face visor. In 2008,

ganization an up-to-date overview of the extent of structur-

these former requirements were downgraded to recommen-

al damage (a common cause of non-explosive injury), then a

dations.17 The author asked for one of these changes because

close-up view of visible suspicious items. They used this in-

the accident record showed that visors were not being worn

formation to make an informed search plan that minimized

(or worn correctly) when accidents occurred whereas goggles

risk to their staff.

were already being used to good effect.18 The requirement was

Those conducting any kind of risk management must first

reduced to allow the wearing of goggles but recommended the

have had appropriate training and/or experience so that they

continued use of visors. The downgrading of the requirement

can identify and mitigate risks. Thereafter, managing risk ef-

for throat protection appears to have gone unnoticed because

fectively in HMA relies on having as much information about

almost all demining body armor still has a collar that folds

each unique task as possible so that an evidence-based risk

back in a blast and protects the wearer’s throat. Nonetheless,

assessment can be made. The use of SUA in Syria provides

after the passage of ten years, it is perhaps time that the PPE

a good example of extending the knowledge available, im-

requirements in IMAS 10.30 were revisited.

proving identification and better mitigating risks in that context. Of course the process does not eliminate risk, but it does
show an organization making “all reasonable effort” to identify risks as they plan to avoid casualties.

There are at least four other needs related to PPE that should
be addressed:
1. To reduce the severity of blast injuries, further improvements in the design of blast resistant hand-tools would
be beneficial, as would their adoption by organizations

Needs
The accident record in the DDAS shows that PPE has been

use but do not require it).

worth wearing because it has often reduced the number or

2. To reduce eye loss, the invention of a lighter and stron-

the severity of the wearer’s injuries. Although we have nev-

ger blast visor material could encourage the correct use

er had PPE that could reliably protect against all common

of visors. This is rumored to have already happened;

fragmentation hazards in HMA, we still do not have a way to

however, the material’s manufacture and use have yet

assess the relative effectiveness of existing or new PPE prod-

to filter down to readily available and affordable dem-

ucts, which might do better.

10

who have not yet done so (the IMAS recommend their

ining PPE.

The hierarchy of common disabling injuries resulting

3. To increase body protection, the development of flex-

from demining accidents over the past twenty years has only

ible ceramic armor (e.g., modified Dragon Skin armor)

changed because stepping on a mine has become much less

or the use of PURE (i.e., the light material used in the

EDITORIAL @ THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

Smith (front) wearing the most commonly used demining PPE in Tajikistan in 2016 – the deminers behind are wearing the ROFI mask.
Images courtesy of Major Firuz Asadbekov, Humanitarian Demining unit, Army of Tajikistan.

ROFI demining face mask) would be worthwhile. This
armor need not be able to protect against rifle fire (often approaching 1,000 m/s), but any increase to com-

The views expressed in articles published in The Journal of Conventional Weapons
Destruction are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense, James Madison
University, or the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery.

fort and affordability in deminer protection would be
an improvement.
4. To allow end users to compare products, the ability to
compare one PPE product’s performance against another in a low-cost test that replicated an agreed, typical
demining accident event would encourage manufacturers to make further incremental improvements.
Finally, while the PPE provision has remained fairly static,
the refinement and development of procedures and equipment that keep people at a distance from the hazards has reduced risk to the deminers in many organizations over the
past 20 years. Alongside the formal conduct of disciplined risk
assessments, the author believes that the avoidance approach
of responsible field operatives often demonstrates doing “all
that is reasonable” to make risk tolerable in spite of the inadequacy of the available PPE.19
See endnotes page 61

Andy Smith
University of Genoa
www.nolandmines.com; www.ddasonline.com
A.V.Smith (AVS, Andy Smith) served as a
PPE specialist on the International Mine
Action Standards (IMAS) Review Board for
11 years and was the founder and keeper of the DDAS.20 He has worked in humanitarian mine action (HMA) over more
than 20 years at all levels from surveyor/
deminer to Chief Technical Advisor to
UNDP country programs. Having drafted the original IMAS Technical
Note for Mine Action on Field Risk Assessment (TNMA), he was
contracted by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) to produce current field risk assessment training
materials in 2016.21
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ADVANCED GEOPHYSICAL
CLASSIFICATION OF WWII-ERA
UNEXPLODED BOMBS USING
BOREHOLE ELECTROMAGNETICS
by Laurens Beran, Ph.D., and Stephen Billings, Ph.D. [ Black Tusk Geophysics, Inc. ]

T

he legacy of World War II-era unexploded bombs

target classification, advanced EM sensors employ three or

(UXB) is an ongoing public safety hazard through-

more transmitters to obtain multiple looks at a target, and

out Europe, and especially in Germany. Large, air-

multiple receivers measure all components (i.e., x, y, and z) of

dropped bombs that are a legacy of Allied bombing campaigns

These digital data are subsequently processed to recover

uations and disposal efforts costing hundreds of thousands of

a location, orientation, and depth for each detected target.

Euros in some instances.

Additionally, intrinsic target parameters, or polarizabilities,

This article presents recent work done by Black Tusk

estimated from the data provide a target fingerprint and can

Geophysics using advanced geophysical classification

be matched against a library of polarizabilities for ordnance.

(AGC) to reliably identify hazardous ordnance at urban sites

Polarizabilities also provide an indication of a target’s size,

in Germany. After brief ly describing electromagnetic (EM)

shape, and composition (i.e., magnetic or non-magnetic met-

sensors and data processing required for AGC, this article

al), and can be used to identify unexpected ordnance that may

will discuss survey and design considerations for character-

not be included in a library.

ization of large, deep UXBs in urban environments.
Advanced Geophysical Classification

12

the secondary fields induced by each transmitter.

are discovered on a weekly basis in Germany, requiring evac-

Advanced Geophysical Classification for Large and
Deep UXB

AGC combines geophysical sensors designed for detection

In the context of the German UXB problem, there are two

and characterization of metallic targets with physical model-

main challenges to the application of AGC. First, ordnance can

ling of digital data to extract an intrinsic fingerprint for each

be significantly deeper than is typically encountered at North

target. This approach allows for reliable identification of intact

American military ranges. Whereas mortars and projectiles

ordnance and rejection of metallic clutter that would other-

are usually restricted to the top 2 m below ground surface,

wise be excavated using conventional clearance methods

larger, air-dropped bombs of 250 lbs or greater are regular-

(e.g., analog detection). Through U.S. Government-funded

ly encountered at depths up to 10 m. This is well outside the

research and development programs, AGC technology has

detection range of typical AGC sensors. Second, most urban

now matured to the point that it is mandated for munitions

sites have nearby infrastructure with a significant amount of

response work in the United States, and contractors must ob-

metal (e.g., rebar, piping, etc.) that produces a strong EM re-

tain International Organization for Standardization (ISO) ac-

sponse and obscures the signal from targets of interest. Images

creditation to perform AGC work.1

1 through 4 (next page) show examples of urban locations

AGC EM sensors rely on the same pulse-induction prin-

where we have carried out borehole AGC surveys in Germany.

ciples used in conventional metal detectors.2 A time-varying

To overcome these challenges to AGC in Germany, we use

primary magnetic field is transmitted into the earth and in-

a high-current transmitter and large transmitter loops to

duces currents in electrically conductive targets. These in-

illuminate targets at depth. This produces a stronger field

duced currents in turn radiate a secondary magnetic field that

at depth than is possible with typical AGC sensors, which

is measured by receivers at the surface. In order to support

have transmitter loop sizes on the order of 1 m. Loops are
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Images 1–4 (left). Examples of borehole EM surveys carried out at urban sites in Germany (blue
PVC tubes are borehole casings). The red cable,
most evident in Image 2, shows the transmitter cable, and wooden stakes are used to position loop corners. The yellow table visible in
Image 3 is used to orient and lock the grey vertical shaft, which has the fluxgate magnetometer at its downhole end.
All graphics courtesy of Boskalis Hirdes GmbH.

ideally arranged to obtain illumination of a
Image 1

deep target from multiple directions. This is
achieved with a rectangular transmitter loop
that generates a vertical field, and figureeight loops that generate horizontal fields
(Figure 1, next page).
The field team collects measurements of the
secondary field induced in a buried target using a fluxgate magnetometer that is deployed
down boreholes. Fluxgate receiver measurements collected at depth significantly increase

Image 2

the amplitude of the measured target response
and attenuate the background response due
to infrastructure. This allows classification
of targets that cannot be detected by typical
AGC sensors deployed at the surface.
Typically, a prospective target is initially
detected with another geophysical sensor deployed at the surface (e.g., ground penetrating
radar or magnetics). Boreholes are subsequently drilled and cased with PVC tubing
at approximately 2 m distance from the target. Fluxgate measurements are made at 0.5 m

Image 3

intervals in each borehole, ideally at depths
ranging down to 2 m below the expected target. The fluxgate magnetometer measures
three components of the magnetic field induced in a target. This receiver also provides
a much longer measurement window (about
50 ms) than the loop receivers usually used for
AGC applications (typically extending out to
about 25 ms). This longer window allows for
improved target classification in the presence
of the background infrastructure response, as
well as rejection of fast-decaying clutter. The
fluxgate magnetometer data does, however,
require removal of the earth’s ambient mag-

Image 4

netic field as well as careful control of sensor
orientation during data acquisition.
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Plan view

Side view

x
Figure 1 (above). Schematic of borehole
EM survey. On the left, the plan view
shows transmitter loops that generate
primary magnetic fields directed in x, y,
and z directions at the center of the survey (red, green, and blue lines, respectively). Loop offsets are for visualization;
in practice loop corners coincide. Blue
circles show typical borehole geometry
with boreholes offset approximately 2 m
from the center of the survey. On the
right, the side view shows primary magnetic fields at the location of a buried
target, boreholes, and receiver apparatus (yellow table and downhole magnetometer in left borehole).

Figure 2 (right). Historical map of Allied
bombing from 1939 to 1945, generated using Theater History of Operations
data.3 Approximately 150 locations
in northern Germany surveyed using borehole electromagnetics are also
shown, with a large concentration in
Oranienburg, just north of Berlin.
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2-10 m

~10 m

y

z

x

Image 5
Borehole survey in Oranienburg, Germany.

Image 6

Image 7

A 500 lb U.S. General Purpose (GP) bomb subsequently excavated at this site. The target was reflected off of bedrock, resulting in
a nose-up orientation that prevented triggering of the delayed-action fuse.

UXB Classification in Oranienburg, Germany

uranium processing for the German nuclear research pro-

Since 2014, Black Tusk Geophysics and partners have car-

gram. On 15 March 1945, American B-17 bombers struck the

ried out more than 100 borehole surveys to characterize buried

town in order to prevent the advancing Soviets from seizing

targets in Germany (Figure 2). The work has been concentrated

German nuclear facilities.

in and around Berlin and in particular in the northern suburb

During multiple air raids on Oranienburg, Allied bomb-

of Oranienburg. This town underwent heavy aerial bombard-

ers dropped ordnance equipped with delayed action fus-

ment from 1944 to 1945. Oranienburg was targeted for its mil-

es designed to trigger detonation hours or days after impact.

itary and logistical importance, and because it was the site of

The fuses were designed to trigger if the bomb rested in a
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Figure 3. Borehole EM data and analysis for survey shown in Images 5, 6 and, 7. Left: Borehole survey geometry with solid lines indicate transmitters, and numbered stars indicate measured boreholes. The red marker indicates estimated target location; the estimated depth is 3.9 m. Right: Estimated polarizabilities (solid lines) and reference polarizabilities for 500 lb U.S. GP bomb (dashed
lines). The vertical dashed line indicates 2 ms time channel for data shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Data collected in the four boreholes for the survey in Figure 3. Axis titles indicate borehole numbers. Observed x, y, and zcomponent data (dots) were measured at 0.5 m intervals between 2.5 and 5.5 m below the ground surface. Data are in units of
picoTesla/Ampere. A strong anomaly is apparent in the data, particularly in borehole 1. Predicted data obtained by fitting a model
to the observed data are shown as solid lines. The model predicts a target at 4 m depth with location and polarizabilities shown
in Figure 3.
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nose-down orientation. However, many delayed action bombs

Black Tusk Geophysics’ AGC analysis. Low amplitude and/or

in Oranienburg ended up in nose-up orientations after they

fast-decaying polarizabilities are diagnostic of smaller items

encountered bedrock, and authorities estimate that there are

and allow for unambiguous target classification and a reduc-

hundreds of unexploded bombs still present in the town.4 The

tion in unnecessary excavations. This is in contrast with other

delayed action fuses are highly unstable and can easily be trig-

geophysical methods used to detect deep UXBs. In particu-

gered if a bomb is disturbed.

lar, while borehole magnetometry can reliably detect ferrous

Images 5, 6 and 7 (previous page) show photos of a borehole

(e.g., steel) targets, characterization with magnetics data can

EM survey and subsequent target excavation carried out in a

be ambiguous because the parameters extracted from mag-

pedestrian area in Oranienburg in 2017. Borehole data collect-

netics data are not uniquely related to target size.5

ed with this survey are shown in Figures 3 and 4. Our AGC

Finally, Images 8 and 9 (next page) highlight quality con-

analysis found that this anomaly was a good match to a 500 lb

trol (QC) of AGC using borehole EM. In the context of con-

U.S. bomb, with slow-decaying polarizabilities that are indic-

ventional AGC surveys using EM sensors deployed at the

ative of intact ordnance.

surface, blind seeding of standardized test items is used by

While the previous example is a clear-cut case of an intact

regulators to verify that classification processing carried out

UXB, the majority of targets (about 80 percent) surveyed using

by a contractor will identify all targets of interest. Given the

borehole EM are eliminated as potential UXBs on the basis of

size and depth of UXBs encountered in borehole surveys,
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Image 8

Image 9

Images 8 and 9. Data collection at a borehole test pit. A 3 m deep test pit is used to collect measurements of ordnance that are
then added to a reference library of target polarizabilities. The test pit is also used to collect QC measurements that verify classification processing.

blind seeding at field sites is impractical. We instead use data
collected at a test site to verify that classification processing
works for known items; groundtruth is withheld from the data
analyst for these data sets. In addition, we have augmented
our polarizability reference library by collecting high-quality
measurements with inert ordnance in the test pit.
Conclusion
Black Tusk Geophysics have extended AGC techniques developed for identification of small, near-surface munitions
to the problem of large, deep UXBs in urban environments.
Using large transmitter loops at the surface and receivers deployed down boreholes, this technology can minimize response from infrastructure and characterize targets that
cannot be detected with EM sensors operating on the surface. AGC processing of borehole data provides improved
identification of UXBs relative to other geophysical methods
(magnetics or radar) and reduces unnecessary excavations of
metallic clutter. Ongoing work is investigating the use of this
technology for characterization of UXBs in the presence of
magnetic soils in Southeast Asia.
This work is published with permission from Boskalis
Hirdes GmbH. Borehole EM data collection and analysis car-
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EOD Pty Ltd.
See endnotes page 61
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Lessons from the Past:
The Rapid Clearance of
Denmark’s Minefields in 1945
by Roly Evans [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]

T

he clearance of the vast majority
of Denmark’s minefields during
1945 was remarkable. In just un-

der five months, a force ranging between
750 and 2,600 German prisoners of war
(POW) under the supervision of 250–350
Danish officers and noncommissioned
officers cleared 1,389,281 mines from an
area of 1,103.2 sq km (425.9 sq mi).1 Such

speed of clearance stands in stark contrast with much of modern humanitarian mine action since the 1990s. This
article will explain how such speed was
possible and why it could not reasonably
be repeated today. The article will also
identify a number of important lessons
that remain to be learned.
Between 1943 and 1945, German forces in Denmark emplaced approximately
1,401,946 anti-personnel and anti-tank
mines, mostly on beaches suitable for
amphibious landing, but also around
key facilities such as radar stations.2 On
4 May 1945 at Lüneburg Heath, east of
Hamburg, the Allies accepted the unconditional surrender of the German
forces in Denmark, along with those
in the Netherlands and northwest
Germany. Item 3 of the Instrument of
Surrender stipulated that “the German
command is to carry out at once, and
without argument or comment, all further orders that will be issued by the
Allied Powers on any subject.”3 On this
basis an initial force of 1,000 German
Image 1. Order of General R.H. Dewing
confirming the establishment of
Minekommando Dänemark.
Image courtesy of Vardemuseerne.
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Image 2. A Sd.Kfz. 251 (Sonderkraftfahrzeug 251) halftrack alongside members of Minekommando Dänemark erecting a minefield
fence, Jutland, Denmark, summer 1945. Excellent minefields records for the vast majority of minefields enabled accurate marking and fencing of dangerous areas and their rapid clearance in the summer of 1945.
Image courtesy of the Danish Coastal Authority.

POWs, mostly Pioneer troops, were required
to conduct clearance within Denmark. To better allow for the provisions of the 1929 Geneva
Convention, the Germans were officially categorized as Surrendered Enemy Personnel rather than POWs. The other 200,000 odd German
troops in Denmark returned to Germany in the
weeks following the surrender.
Clearance started quickly and proceeded
quickly. On 11 May 1945, within one week of
the unconditional surrender, the first clearance tasks had begun.4 This arrangement was
formalized on 18 June 1945 with the founding of Minekommando Dänemark by order of
General Dewing, commander of the British
forces in Denmark. The initial contingent of
1,000 Pioneer soldiers had fallen to 750 in six
weeks, most likely at least in part due to accidents; the June order increased the group to
1,892 officers and men.5 By August 1945 the
Image 3. Members of Minekommando Dänemark prodding for mines, Jutland Denmark, summer 1945. Prodding was often the main
method of detection in Minekommando Dänemark, and this was probably linked to the high casualty rate. Today prodding is used
as an aid excavation and is rarely deemed suitable as a primary means of detection. Note how close the deminers, without any
PPE, are to each other. Today basic safety distances, site marking, and wearing of PPE would be enforced as a matter of routine.
Mapham, James (Sergeant), No. 5 Army Film & Photographic Unit.
Image courtesy of WAR OFFICE SECOND WORLD WAR OFFICIAL COLLECTION, IWM.
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four versions of the Tellermine. For anti-tank mines
that were not easily detected, such as the Holzmine,
only long prodders could be used. A breakdown of
the 1,389,281 mines cleared between 11 May and 31
September 1945 can be found in Table 1.
Sometimes highly detailed clearance statistics were
collected and recorded. Mines removed from a panel (i.e., a grouping or block of mine rows) would be
marked as missing or booby-trapped. The same precision involved in creating the excellent minefield records
was often repeated in the maintenance of clearance records.15 At a national level the number of mines found
Image 4. Still frame from the 1945 film Livsfare Miner showing members of Minekommando Dänemark prodding from a standing position
for anti-tank mines, Jutland 1945.
Image courtesy of the Danish Film Institute.13

per day was recorded (see Table 1). Even today, many
countries could not give a similar breakdown of the
mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) cleared,
despite the huge advances in information technology.

number grew to 2,600.6 Two-thirds of the personnel were di-

With pen, paper, and typewriters, better basic statistics were

rectly employed in the field, while the remainder fulfilled staff

available over seventy years ago than is sometimes the case

functions. The organization of the clearance is worth not-

currently at national and even program level today.

ing. The British had overall command of the demining ef-

Minekommando Dänemark also innovated in terms of the

fort from the old German headquarters on Rådhuspladsen in

use of mechanical assets. A number of Panzer III tanks, StuG

Copenhagen. Major Stanley Holland, Royal Artillery, was the

III assault guns, and Sd.Kfz. 251 halftracks, often in bad con-

officer in charge. Supervision would be conducted by a cad-

dition, were co-opted into service. Typically these would be

re of about 250–350 Danish officers and men within an or-

used as some form of verification asset after clearance in a

ganization known as Dansk Minekontrol, headed by Kaptajn

form of quality control known at the time as “test runs.” Two

D.A.Wieth-Knudsen.7 Working for both was the head of

types of test runs were devised: an anti-tank minefield run

German Minekommando Dänemark, Hauptmann Geuer, for-

and an anti-personnel and anti-tank minefield run. Unlike

mally Head of the Wehrmacht Pioneer School in Horsens.

most modern mine verification vehicles, rollers were fitted to

8,9

The Dewing order of 18 June 1945 was explicit on a number

the rear of the tanks. Initially rollers were made of concrete,

of points. First, “the execution of the work is completely left to
the Germans themselves - they can use which methods they
wish to take up the mines provided all security measures for
the protection of civilians and property are observed. At each
Minefield where mining takes place, at least one Danish sol-

Type of
Mine

Model of Mine

AT Mine

Number
Cleared Type

Number
Cleared Model

452,819
Teller Mines

326,407

with all regulations and rules.”10 Second, Minenkommando

Riegelmine

16,519

were to “complete the demining in Denmark at the shortest

Holzmine

85,435

possible time.”11

Pansermine Danemark

24,458

dier must be in control and he is responsible for compliance

The Germans used a number of methods to remove mines.

AP Mine

936,462

Many of these would be deemed dangerous today. Safety dis-

S-Mine

188,835

tances between deminers were not observed in a way recogniz-

Schützenmine

311,334

able now. Prodding for mines in groups without any personal

Stockmine

213,338

protective equipment was routine, whereas it now only tends

Schutzenmine Danemak og berger (locally
made Schu Mines)

222,955

be used as a secondary aid to excavation rather than a primary
detection technique. Prodding was also done using long prodders when searching for anti-tank mines.12
British Number 3 mine detectors were also available to
search for metallic anti-tank mines, most commonly one of

TOTAL

1,389,281

1,389,281

Table 1. Table showing breakdown of mines cleared in Denmark
11 May–31 September 1945.14
Table courtesy of author.
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Image 5. Members of Minekommando Dänemark erecting a minefield fence, Jutland, Denmark, summer 1945. A bunker can just be
made out on the sand dune behind the second figure from the right. As elsewhere on the Atlantic Wall, the minefields emplaced by
the Germans were integrated into a wider defensive system and would often be covered by fire from a hardened shelter.
Image courtesy of the Danish Coastal Authority.

Image 6. Members of Minekommando Dänemark pose on the front of a Sturmgeschütz III (StuG III) assault gun, Jutland, summer
1945. The Stug III was one of a number of armored vehicles used to tow rollers.
Image courtesy of the Danish Coastal Authority.
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Image 7. Members of Minekommando Dänemark pose with a number of Stockmine 43s and three Tellermine 42s cleared from a
nearby minefield, Jutland, Denmark, summer 1945.
Image courtesy of Dan Mouritzsen – Silkeborg Bunkermuseum Denmark.

Image 8. Members of Minekommando Dänemark walking the ground they have cleared in Jutland, Denmark, summer 1945. The
practice of marching in close order over land to prove it was clear was widespread in the post-war years throughout Europe. Often
the local population would be invited to observe in order to reassure them that their land was clear. While it appears callous, an
equivalent does occur today—sometimes a clearance organization will play football on land cleared to reassure the local population. Mapham, James (Sergeant), No. 5 Army Film & Photographic Unit.
Image courtesy of WAR OFFICE SECOND WORLD WAR OFFICIAL COLLECTION, IWM.
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Image 9 (top). Still from the 2015 Danish-German film Land of Mine, showing cleared Tellermine 42s defused and awaiting transport to a demolition site. Often more mines were cleared daily in Denmark in 1945 than are cleared yearly in a number of countries today.
Image 10 (middle). Still from the 2015 Danish-German film Land of Mine, showing a character prodding for mines. Today if mines
are hard to detect due to having minimum metal content or are in ground with heavy metal contamination, the deminer will usually employ full excavation within their lane rather than prodding.
Image 11 (bottom). Still from the 2015 Danish-German film Land of Mine, showing the terrain of the Juntland coast.
All images this page courtesy of Camilla Hjelm.
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Image 12. Dansk Minekrontrol graph showing the number of mines cleared daily in Denmark 11 May–31 September 1945. A conservative estimate of mines cleared versus working days gives an average of 9,715 mines cleared a day. Such daily clearance totals are
remarkable and are rarely if ever repeated today.
Image courtesy of Dan Mouritzsen – Silkeborg Bunkermuseum Denmark.16

but these disintegrated too easily during repeated test runs.

Geneva Conventions were updated. A revised Article 52 stat-

Concrete was replaced by steel and concrete rollers especial-

ed that “Unless he be a volunteer, no prisoner of war may be

ly made at the Varde Steelworks. Fifteen vehicles are record-

employed on labour which is of an unhealthy or dangerous

ed as initiating mines with their tracks during test runs.18

nature. The removal of mines or similar devices shall be con-

Panzer IIIs and StuG IIIs mainly only lost a track and a

sidered as dangerous labour.”23

wheel. Unfortunate drivers typically experienced hearing

The post-war clearance of Europe as a whole was undoubt-

damage. Examples of the patterns driven in test runs can be

edly quick, both by the standards of the day and historically.

seen in Images 17 and 18.

While hard to prove categorically, the 1945 Denmark clear-

The clearance of Denmark was costly, as was recognized

ance operation was probably amongst the fastest ever under-

at the time. In December 1945, Dansk Minekrontrol listed

taken. On average in Denmark in the summer of 1945, 9,715

149 dead, 165 severely injured, and 167 lightly injured dur-

mines were cleared daily. By way of comparison to Denmark’s

ing the demining effort.20 While the total workforce was not

1,389,281 mines cleared from an area of over 1,103.2 sq km

static, Dansk Minekrontrol calculated that 20 percent of all

(425.9 sq mi) by a force ranging between 750 and 2,600

deminers were either killed or injured. Dansk Minekrontrol

German POWs, in the Netherlands between 20 May and 31

were keen to point out that the statistic of 100 deminers

December 1945, the Draeger Brigade of up to 3,688 personnel

killed and 240 injured for every million mines removed

cleared 1,079,857 landmines.24 The scale and speed of both ef-

in Denmark compared favorably to France, where it was

forts in Denmark and Holland are perhaps dwarfed by those

claimed that 1,000 deminers were killed and 1,000 were in-

in France, where from 1945 to 1947, 48,000 German POWs

jured for every million mines cleared.

and 3,000 French deminers cleared 13 million mines at a cost

21

Demining was and is dangerous. In the 1940s, demining

of 1,709 killed and 3,000 injured.25

techniques were in their infancy. The casualties among al-

In November 2004, during a speech in Nairobi, a senior

lied military deminers were also very high.22 In 1949, the

mine action figure compared the European efforts in the
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Image 13. Dansk Minekrontrol map showing the general locations of 1,389,281 mines cleared in Denmark 11 May–31 September 1945.
On each line the figure above indicates anti-tank mines, the figure below indicates anti-personnel mines.
Image courtesy of Dan Mouritzsen, Silkeborg Bunkermuseum Denmark.17
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Image courtesy of the Danish Engineer Regiment.

Image 14. The minefield record for the Luftwaffe Directional Radio Relay Station in Kirkehöje. The detail and precision
of the record is impressive. The draftsman who completed it was the equivalent of a Lance Corporal. Modern clearance
operators rarely if ever get access to minefield records of this quality. Such records are key in enabling rapid clearance
and reasoned land release decisions based on evidence.

skilled and made very accurate minefield maps. This was nothing short of essential for rapid minefield clearance. A
good example of such minefield records
can be seen at Kirkehöje R.V.St. near
Paarup in central Denmark. Between
26 July and 7 August 1944, a minefield
of 5,983 Schützenminen was emplaced
around the Luftwaffe Directional Radio
Relay finding station. Obergefreiter
Busse produced the minefield record,
reproduced in Image 14, and the panel record reproduced in Image 22. The
high level of detail and precision was
common in German minefield records
across Europe. This level of detail included the location of each panel and
the number of Schützenminen it contained as well as the panel plan showing which mines were booby-trapped
and which mines were left out of the
pattern. Such detail would be envied
by many modern clearance operators,
even those clearing pattern minefields
with reasonable minefield records in locations such as Turkey and the Falkland
Islands/Malvinas. The principle problem of modern mine clearance, “where
are the mines?” did not really exist in
Denmark in 1945.
In many mine-affected countries in
Image 15 and Image 16. Rollers attached to the back of Panzer IIIs and a StuG III assault
gun used for quality control, Denmark 1945.
Images courtesy of Dan Mouritzsen, Silkeborg Bunkermuseum Denmark.

Europe, much of life today carries on
as if there had never been minefields.
The town of Esbjerg on the east coast of
Jutland, very near to the Skallingen pen-

1940s directly to the slowness of modern clearance opera-

insula, illustrates this point. The town was heavily fortified by

tions.26 Was this a fair comparison? The answer is yes and no.

the Germans from 1943 onwards on both the seaward and land-

Yes in that modern clearance efforts are not as efficient as they

ward side since any allied landing in the area would have needed

could be. But no in that it is not practical to repeat much of

to capture such a large port as soon as possible. Images 19 and 20

the 1940s approach in the modern context. How much speed

show the overall minefield plan for Esbjerg. Anti-tank and anti-

of clearance in Denmark contributed to high casualty figures

personnel minefields were integrated to cover landward approach-

remains debated to this day.27 Acceptance of casualties can be

es along with various prepared demolitions in the port area.

argued to be a contributory factor in the rapid clearance but

Esbjerg was cleared during the summer of 1945. Records

it was by no means the only factor or necessarily the key one.

detail 63,888 mines of all types being removed.29 Image 23

The main reason why Denmark and other countries could be

shows Esbjerg as it is today, much expanded, with the for-

cleared so fast was simple: the operators knew where the mines

mer minefields superimposed onto housing estates, industri-

were. The Germans kept excellent records of the vast ma-

al sites, etc. As with other countries in Europe at the time, it

jority of their minefields. Wehrmacht draftsmen were highly

was shown that the recovery from landmines could be rapid
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anti-personnel mines.”32 The movement of the sand presented further problems. Even in 1945, mines
that had been in the ground for one
or two years could be found under
1.5 m (1.6 yd) of sand.33 Movement
of mines by the sea was also an issue, just as it had been in the United
Kingdom from 1940 onward.34 The
records suggested around 72,000
mines were laid at Skallingen of
which 61,000 were cleared up to
1947.35 Skallingen appears to be the
one place where German minefield
record keeping fell below the normal standard. It is also the one area
that was not cleared in 1945. Since
1947, a further 3,500 were cleared,
and an estimated 2,500 were swept
away, having been in an area eroded
by the sea over time. From 2005 to
2012, Denmark conducted the difficult and costly clearance of the last
minefields believed to be in an area
of 187,200 sq m (223,889.3 sq yd). A
further 3,357 mines and 552 other
items were destroyed.36
Summary
Debate will continue about the
decision of the Allies to co-opt
Surrendered Enemy Personnel to
conduct mine clearance in the 1940s,
Image 17 and Image 18. Test runs patterns for quality control of cleared anti-tank minefields and anti-personnel minefields.
Images courtesy of Dan Mouritzsen – Silkeborg Bunkermuseum Denmark.19

especially given a recent film on the
subject called Under sandet or Land
of Mine in English. The demining
techniques used then were far high-

to a point where the legacy is barely remembered by the gen-

er risk than those that would be acceptable now. The inabil-

eral population decades later.

ity to fully repeat this approach to some degree undermines

In December 1945, the Danes declared that 99 percent of

direct comparisons with modern mine action. However, the

the minefields in the country had been cleared—a remarkable

key factor that allowed such rapid clearance, regardless of

achievement by any standard and one that deserves recognition

casualties, was the excellent minefield records kept by those

despite the high human cost involved.30 Most mine clearance

who emplaced the minefields in the first place. In many parts

by German POWs appears to have finished in February 1946.

31

of the world we unfortunately do not have the equivalent re-

The only areas remaining to be cleared were in Skallingen.

cords that allow rapid identification of the actual contaminat-

These minefields presented a particularly difficult challenge.

ed ground and quick clearance.

“The remaining mines were laid in a random distribution

It is clear that modern-day mine action still has much to

and consisted of several types, including both anti-tank and

learn from those who went before us, not least the importance
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Image 19 (left) and Image 20 (above). Original overall German minefield plan for the defence of Esbjerg. Any Allied landing on the west coast of Denmark was unlikely due to difficulties in providing air cover. If such a landing had been attempted it would have required the capture of a port. Esbjerg was the second largest port in Denmark and the only viable option
on the west coast of the country. For this reason the islands and spits on the seaward side, including Skallingen, were heavily mined. On the landward side of Esbjerg and around the port itself, 63,888 mines of all types were removed in 1945.
Images courtesy of the Danish Engineer Regiment.
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Image 21. Damage caused by an anti-tank mine on the track of a Panzer III during a “Test Run” of a minefield, Jutland, Denmark,
summer 1945.
Image courtesy of Dan Mouritzsen – Silkeborg Bunkermuseum Denmark.

of field staff collecting sufficient and accurate data in order to
better allow effective conduct of their operations and to better address the Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 obligations.37 The
Germans and Danes collected better data with pen, paper,
and typewriter in 1945 than many programs and national authorities manage today with computers. We should aim to not
only match them, but routinely surpass them. The introduction of IMSMA Core in coming years will hopefully aid improvements in relevant data collection and analysis. What is
also needed is a change in working culture amongst more field
staff so that they see accurate data collection and reporting as
fundamental to their role.
What is indisputable is the bravery and sacrifice of those
German deminers who, often very young, gave so much in the
summer of 1945 in order to assist Denmark and other countries in Europe to begin the recovery from such a destructive
conflict. I know of no memorial to these and the other POWs
who died or were injured, in Denmark or in any other
European country. Perhaps those who gave so much so that
Image 22 (right). One of the panel layouts for Fink section of
the Kirkehöje minefield. Most mines emplaced by the Germans
would be recorded individually in a panel plan such as this. Red
crosses indicated booby trapped Schutzenmines, blue where
mines were deliberately not laid. Note that in this panel of 143
mines, 19 Schutzenmines (13%) were booby trapped with antilift devices.
Image courtesy of the Danish Engineer Regiment.
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Image 23. Previous minefields cleared in 1945 superimposed on an expanded Esbjerg today. Red lines indicate anti tanks minefields containing either Tellermines or Holzmines. Green lines indicate anti-personnel minefields containing either Schützminen,
Stockmines or S-Mines. S-Mines were known to cause most casualties to both attacking troops and deminers.
Image courtesy of the Danish Engineer Regiment.

these minefields would no longer endanger civilians should be
recognized, regardless of the regime they once served?
The author wishes to sincerely thank the following without whom this article would not have been possible. Major
Peter Jegsen, Lance Corporal Preben Erichs, Dan Mouritzsen,
Martin Jebens, John Jensen, and Antoon Meijers.
See endnotes page 61
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Field Notes
Minefield Sketch Maps in
Humanitarian Mine Action
by Jesse Hamlin and Luan Jaupi [ The HALO Trust ]

An example of a minefield sketch map in Cambodia from 1997. Each red dot represents the location of an anti-personnel mine
that was destroyed by The HALO Trust.
All graphics courtesy of The HALO Trust.

D

igital technology has the ability to bring mine-

layers, and used to allow HALO to build its database of activi-

field artifacts from the field to life. The HALO

ties through digitization of paper records alongside data that

Trust (HALO) has been using Colortrac large for-

is recorded directly onto tablets.

mat scanners in several programs around the world, to scan
minefield sketch maps from the field, allowing these historical records to be viewed on desktop and laptop computers.

34

Preserving Historical Records

A minefield sketch map is a large, A0-sized, hand-drawn

Once the maps are scanned, they are georeferenced in geo-

minefield map that is drawn to scale on grid paper. HALO has

graphic information systems (GIS) to display alongside other

been drawing these maps for surveyed and cleared minefields

FIELD NOTES @ THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

A minefield briefing in Cambodia is aided by the use of a minefield sketch map.

A data clerk scans a minefield sketch map from the field using a Colortac SmartLF Ci 40 large-format scanner and georeferenced
it on top of minefield polygons in GIS.

since the mid-1990’s, which included the period when mod-

Prior to clearance, a minefield supervisor hand-draws a

ern GPS signals were not available to the general public. In

sketch map for the minefield and constantly updates it during

2000, selective availability from the intentional degradation

demining operations. The maps are also used for minefield

of public GPS signals for national security reasons, was abol-

briefing visits. As areas are cleared and mines or unexploded

ished by the U.S. Government under the direction of President

ordnance (UXO) are discovered, the supervisor marks these

Clinton.1 All survey and clearance team leaders are trained on

milestones on the map. After the minefield is cleared, which

how to draw a minefield sketch map to scale in the field, based

can take several months, a final sketch map is drawn showing

on the specific coordinate system (e.g., Universal Transverse

the areas cleared, devices destroyed, and any accidents that

Mercator or latitude/longitude) and units (e.g., meters or dec-

took place prior to clearance as reported by the local residents.

imal degrees) used in country. Many of HALO’s operations

The final minefield completion sketch map is symbolic of the

supervisors take great pride in producing high-quality sketch

completion of the mined area and is used during handovers

maps, and some are truly works of art.

with the local population to explain what areas were cleared.
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Boundaries of sketch maps georeferenced in GIS creating a nationwide mosaic and displayed in a web map. The sketches display
once zoomed in on the web map.

The town of Anlong Veng in the north of Cambodia was one of the most heavily mined villages HALO encountered. Red dots show
anti-personnel mines destroyed, blue areas indicate the areas HALO cleared, and green areas show the boundaries of the sketch
maps of the minefields that were scanned and georeferenced.

After the completion of demining operations on a particular minefield, each map is finalized and sent to the program

36

has used large format scanners in Afghanistan, Angola,
Cambodia, Laos, Mozambique, Somaliland, and Sri Lanka.

headquarters in each country for storage, digitizing in a PDF

Once the maps are in electronic format, it opens up several

format, and archiving. Each map scan is then stored on a stan-

new ways to access the information. When stored on a central

dard Windows file server for access by staff members. HALO

file server, the maps can be accessed by multiple computers in

FIELD NOTES @ THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

A sketch map georeferenced and displayed in a web map. Red dots are mines destroyed by HALO, skulls represent accident
locations.

the office. Electronic format is also a safeguard against map

Desktop GIS has the ability to georeference (that is, to align

degradation or catastrophic destruction (e.g., flood or fire),

geographic data to a known coordinate system so it can be

and all maps are backed up on external hard drives or the

viewed, queried, and analyzed with other geographic data)

cloud. Lastly, maps can be imported into GIS and georefer-

minefield sketch maps on top of other layers.2 HALO uses

enced on top of minefield polygon data for an added level of

the geo-referencing toolbar in ArcGIS to geo-reference sketch

detail. Once several maps are georeferenced, they can be com-

maps in line with minefield polygon areas. When overlaid

bined into a single layer and published as a map service avail-

with the minefield polygon boundary in GIS, a more detailed

able to program staff via desktop or web GIS. This process will

picture can be represented. This assists operations in planning

be described in detail later.

future operations and understanding the nature of the threat

Bringing GIS to Life

on legacy minefields.
Taking this a step further, once multiple sketch maps are

In today’s age, HALO uses advanced web GIS, high-

scanned and georeferenced, they can be combined into one

resolution satellite imagery, and mobile devices to collect data

layer, which displays all sketch maps (on top of the minefield

from the field. However, there is still huge value in drawing the

polygons) in a country. In order to prevent the issue of mul-

paper sketch maps to scale in the field, as the accuracy of data

tiple maps overlapping each other and obstructing the details

collected in the field on tablets can be subpar (plus or minus

of a particular minefield, each rectangular map is clipped to

30–50 meters accuracy depending on signal and strength of

its polygon boundary in ArcGIS. After this process is com-

the receiver). Moreover, the sketch maps provide an added lev-

pleted, the maps can be viewed by data managers, operations

el of detail typically not captured in GIS or most mine action

officers, and program managers in desktop or web GIS, or as

databases. Verified details such as nearby villages, trails, riv-

paper printouts or wall maps. HALO uses ArcGIS Server to

ers, other operators’ clearance, and technical survey breach-

publish layers like these in Cambodia for consumption on a

ing lanes can be displayed on the maps along with the polygon

program web map, which is accessible to anyone with access

boundary. The maps also record important information about

to its internal network.

the approximate locations of mines destroyed or previous ac-

The last step is to digitize mine locations and mine acci-

cidents the local community (or their animals) may have had

dents directly into HALO’s database. Most mine action oper-

on the minefield.

ators record the boundary (i.e., polygon area) of a mined area
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The same map with the mines and accidents digitized into HALO’s PostgreSQL database and overlaid. All of this information is accessible via an ArcGIS Server web service on an interactive web map to operations staff.

in a database but rarely record the actual locations of the de-

monarchist opposition forces used landmines to protect new-

stroyed mines, which can often be a laborious process as GPS

ly won ground or to contaminate the interior of abandoned

coordinates need to be recorded for each device in the field. By

Vietnamese defensive positions.

using the approximate locations on the sketch maps, HALO’s

Although 50 percent of Cambodia’s minefields have now

data clerks can digitize the point locations directly into its en-

been cleared, Cambodia is still one of the most landmine im-

terprise database platforms (e.g., SQL Server, PostgreSQL).

pacted countries in the world with over 64,000 casualties re-

These data are then published as layers using ArcGIS Server to

corded since 1979 and over 25,000 amputees—the highest

a web map (Leaflet API or ArcGIS Online), which allows non-

ratio per capita in the world.3 More than 80 percent of the total

GIS personnel to access the layers as they are updated in real

population live in rural areas, in communities dependent on

time in HALO’s database. This enables the organization to

agriculture. Northwest Cambodia has seen a 35 percent pop-

better demonstrate and understand the threat on the ground.

ulation increase since hostilities ceased and this rapid pop-

Case Study: HALO’s Use of Sketch Map
Digitiz ation in Cambodia
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ulation growth has meant these areas represent a very high
relative percentage of the national total of mine accidents.
Despite a reduction in casualty numbers over recent years,

Landmines were laid in Cambodia during the ousting of

Cambodia’s mine and explosive problem is still a major im-

the Khmer Rouge in 1979 and continued until its demise in

pediment to the social and economic development of the

1998. Through a series of dry season offensives from 1984 to

country. The landmine threat is now largely concentrated in

1985, the Vietnamese military drove the Khmer Rouge (and

just 21 border districts in the rural northwest of Cambodia.

230,000 civilians) across the border into Thailand. To impede

It prevents development by hindering access to land, water

the return of the Khmer Rouge, tens of thousands of local

sources, roads, and health services, and it imposes financial

people were forcibly conscripted into constructing a barri-

and emotional hardship on families needing to care for a land-

er minefield along the entire 750 kilometer (466 mile) length

mine survivor.

of the Cambodia-Thai border, a defensive plan known as the

The amount of data generated and minefields recorded in

K5 Belt. Further landmines were laid by State of Cambodia

Cambodia is staggering. A final minefield sketch map is hand

forces to defend towns, villages, and supply routes from at-

drawn for each completed minefield once it has been cleared of

tack by opposition forces. In addition, Khmer Rouge and

all known mines and ordnance. Some of the sketch maps have
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A mosaic that displays all anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines, and items of UXO destroyed by HALO, as well as any human or
animal accidents recorded on the program web maps, accessible to all program staff.

huge numbers of mines, a direct reflection of the level of contamination in the country and how dense the mines laid on
the K5 mine belt really are.

Jesse Hamlin
Global GIS & Database Officer
The HALO Trust
Jesse Hamlin is Global GIS & Database
Officer for The HALO Trust. He travels to
all HALO programs to assist with GIS, database, and IT. He has held this position
since January 2015. Hamlin holds a bachelor’s degree in GIS from the University of
Calgary and a master’s degree in GIS from
the University of Redlands, California, and
is IMSMA A1 certified.

The Cambodia program has now georeferenced all of its
minefield sketch maps (11,762 as of August 2017). From this,
an astonishing 164,000 records were digitized off of these
maps by the program staff in order to create the mosaics for
the web maps in GIS. A summary of the digitized records is
below (numbers from August 2017):

1. 147, 852 anti-personnel mines
2. 1,150 anti-tank mines
3. 12,927 UXO
4. 1,858 human accidents on minefields prior to clearance
5. 272 animal accidents

HALO is working to scan sketch maps in all of its countries
in order to preserve and digitize this important work. As the
technology for large-format scanners continues to improve
and with reduced costs to acquire the technology, this goal
should be achieved very soon.

Luan Jaupi
Head of ICT
The HALO Trust
Luan Jaupi joined The HALO Trust in 2005.
He is responsible for all information management and GIS in headquarters and all
HALO programs. He has a master’s degree
in computer science from the University
of Tirana, Albania, and a master’s degree
in business informatics from the European
University of Viadrina, Germany.

See endnotes page 62
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Field Notes
Mitigating Adverse Environmental
Impacts in Mine Action
by Martin Jebens [ DRM-Consultancy ] and
Gianluca Maspoli, Ph.D., [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]

I

n order to help mitigate adverse environmental im-

and in particular IMAS 10.70 “Safety & occupational health

pacts, this article supports the mainstreaming of envi-

- Protection of the environment.”1 This guidance can be im-

ronmental concerns into mine action. This is achievable

proved, and this article proposes changes to IMAS 10.70 in or-

by strengthening existing standards, and is motivated by two
main factors.
Firstly, an increased consideration of environmental issues
is based on growing concerns about climate change and is re-

der to better reflect current needs and practices.

Why the Environment Matters

The environment is the foundation for sustainable develop-

flected in international treaties and agreements. Additionally,

ment and significantly influences people’s livelihoods at local,

the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda)

regional, and global levels. Over the past decades, the envi-

and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction

ronment has become a major concern. On one hand, climate

(SFDRR) are significantly important to the protection of the

change endangers all societies but especially those in develop-

environment and are relevant frameworks for mine action.

ing countries. On the other hand, human development and

Secondly, International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) are
an essential tool for mainstreaming environmental concerns,

armed conflicts have impacted the environment via increased
pollution and exploitation of resources.2

Figure 1. Commitment to environment protection and risk reduction.
Figure courtesy of Gravitazz, the United Nations, and IHG.
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National legislation and various international trea-

risk reduction is not a stand-alone process, it needs to be co-

ties target environmental protection, including the Geneva

ordinated with sustainable development; therefore, SFDRR is

Conventions, which prohibit all means and methods of war-

linked to the SDGs. The SFDRR states that activities like natu-

fare that cause severe, widespread, or long-term damage to

ral resources management, land use, and urban planning are

the environment.3 The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention

central to disaster risk reduction. It introduces “a wide scope

(APMBC) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM)

that includes risk of small-scale and slow-onset disasters as

account for the environment in relation to extension re-

well as man-made, technological, environmental, and biologi-

quests and transparency reports.4 Other international agree-

cal hazards.”7 As such, the SFDRR also applies to mine action.

ments and treaties like the Paris Agreement, the Convention

The SFDRR does not determine how to manage specific di-

on Biological Diversity, and the Convention to Combat

saster risks but outlines how disaster risk reduction needs to

Desertification pay specific attention to the environment.

be holistic. It calls for coherence between disaster risk man-

Their aim is to lower the risk of loss of life and poverty and

agement policies and practices across sectors related to the

improve people’s daily lives by advocating for sustainable and

environment, technological hazards, and biological hazards

holistic solutions. Moreover, important international frame-

respectively.7 Therefore, a key element in the SFDRR is to en-

works like the 2030 Agenda and the SFDRR have brought ad-

sure that stakeholders coordinate across sectors and on all lev-

ditional focus to the environment.

els: locally, nationally, and internationally.
The SFDRR and the 2030 Agenda are highly-developed

Sustainable Development and
Risk Reduction

frameworks, forming a platform for environmental protection that should be integrated in the mine action sector. The

The 2030 Agenda is intended “to end all forms of poverty,

driver in these frameworks is to decrease the risk to human

fight inequalities and tackle climate change” and the environ-

life by developing capacity and to increase resilience, thereby

ment is featured prominently as one of the three fundamental

creating a better future.8 In order to do so, an improved col-

dimensions, in addition to economic and social issues.5 The

laboration among mine action organizations and other stake-

17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 Agenda

holders is needed, not only through policies and planning,

address these three dimensions and aim to shape global devel-

but also through monitoring and evaluation.9 These require-

opment, peacebuilding, and humanitarian agendas.

ments are addressed by the International Organization for

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian

Standardization (ISO) in their current version of standards on

Demining (GICHD) has looked into how mine action can

environmental management (e.g., ISO 14001:2015) and should

contribute to the implementation of the SDGs and how they

be included in IMAS 10.70.

can be mainstreamed within mine action.6 The

Disaster Risk Management

GICHD’s study shows that 12 of 17 SDGs are directly relevant for mine action and points out
that SDGs can bring a new emphasis on environmental mitigation measures for impacts
like “deforestation, land degradation, climate
change vulnerability and loss of biodiversity.”6
The study also identifies that mine-affected
countries, operators, and donors intend to re-

Plan

view their mine action strategies with the pur-

Act

pose of aligning with the SDGs.6 Ultimately, the
2030 Agenda brings new momentum to protect-

Do
Check

ing the environment and calls for an enhancement of the existing instruments in mine action.
The SFDRR was adopted by U.N. Member
States on 18 March 2015 at the Third U.N. World

Sustainable Development

Mine Action Sector

Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction. The
SFDRR aims to reduce the risks from both natural hazards and man-made disasters. Disaster

Figure 2. Integrating mine action, SDGs and SFDRR.
Figure courtesy of Martin Jebens and Carlo Sorensen.
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Figure 2 (previous page) illustrates the need to inte-

long-term environmental damages that consisted of “soil dis-

grate disaster risk reduction, SDGs, and the mine ac-

turbance, soil compaction and loss of biodiversity and deteri-

tion sector to foster the protection of the environment.10

oration of vegetation cover.”12

It underlines the requirement for introducing the plan–

Another example is Yemen, where the rural population de-

do–check–act (PDCA) principle, which is a fundamen-

pends on a very sensitive environment, and traditional laws

tal condition in the ISO system to reduce environmental

forbid the cutting of trees. Studies show that poverty is higher

risks by adopting ISO standards or adapting other stan-

in contaminated areas.13 In such contexts, mine action helps

dards (e.g., IMAS) to address specific challenges. The ISO

to fight poverty by granting access to grazing and farming

should serve as a basis for the adjustment of IMAS 10.70,

lands, and to sources of water and firewood. However, these

as well as taking into account regional differences and the

positive impacts demand trade-offs between operational re-

need to avoid transferring risks. This has to be done by

quirements, local practices, and environmental features in or-

assessing environmental and societal needs. In addition,

der to avoid unintended consequences.

it is important to keep in mind that planning itself is not

The mitigation of possible negative environmental im-

enough to decrease risks for the environment and must go

pacts is also relevant in contexts that are not immediate post-

hand-in-hand with awareness rising.

conflict but where there are legal international obligations.
For example, the Skallingen peninsula in Denmark was con-

Environment, Mine Action, and
International Mine Action Standards
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taminated by landmines from World War II, and clearance
was needed to fulfill obligations under the APMBC, but the

Mine action can impact the environment positively but

country had to preserve the ecology of Skallingen, which is a

also negatively by degrading land or giving rise to pollution,

protected area. A study of the environment was thus conduct-

therein changing the ecosystem and affecting civilians’

ed, and clearance included methods that reduce the impact on

livelihoods. Appropriate assessments and management can

wildlife and erosion.14

help in incorporating environmental mitigation measures.

The GICHD has worked to improve the mitigation of ad-

These include sound applications of the land release ap-

verse environmental impacts in mine action as well. Particular

proach to limit heavily-invasive clearance methods and ap-

attention was given to mechanical clearance, which is a cost-

propriate remediation activities.

effective method but can create adverse impacts like erosion,

In 2005, Ian McLean pointed out that environmental is-

deforestation, ground pollution, and soil structure damage.15

sues were “treated as peripheral” and argued in favor of a

However, environmental considerations are not restricted to

higher consideration, especially in the context of “main-

mechanical clearance, as other activities can produce negative

streaming demining with development.” According to

consequences: disposal of ordnance, disposal of debris and

McLean, there was a need to “explore the issue, raise aware-

hazardous waste, burning of vegetation, establishment and

ness, create incentives and educate the practitioners.”

dismantlement of temporary facilities, and transportation of

11

Since then, awareness has increased, impacts of contami-

hazardous material.16 Mine action, as well as other humani-

nation and clearance operations are better understood, and

tarian operations, has a potential impact on the environment

methods to reduce such impacts have been developed. The

due to the presence of staff, equipment, and facilities, which

relevance of adapting mine action operations to fragile eco-

may create stress on local resources and environmental deg-

systems is documented, and experiences show that mitiga-

radation if improperly managed.17

tion of negative impacts is important to ensure livelihoods,

The increased awareness and knowledge of environmental

avoid additional environmental degradation, and take ad-

issues is reflected in the IMAS 10.70, which sets general re-

vantage of opportunities for sustainable development.

quirements and responsibilities for the protection of the en-

For instance, conflicts put natural environments under

vironment. It states that operations “should be carried out

stress and contamination from mines contributes to this,

without damaging property or infrastructure, in a manner

especially in contexts where the balance between the eco-

that minimizes the impact on the environment” and planning

system and human activities can be easily disrupted. This

“shall take into account the effects of those operations, and

is illustrated by the case of Kuwait, which suffered contami-

any supporting activities, on the environment.”18 Ultimately,

nation during the Gulf War in 1990–1991 and went through

mine action organizations should ensure that the land “is left

clearance operations in the aftermath. The laying of land-

in a state whereby it is suitable for its intended use once dem-

mines and clearance operations produced immediate and

ining operations cease.”18
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Image 1. The need for remediation after clearance is evident from the Skallingen project.
Image courtesy of Martin Jebens and the Danish Coastal Authority.

IMAS are a key instrument to mainstream the protection

the strategy was supported by the United Nations Development

of the environment, and there is room for a review of IMAS

Programme (UNDP) in Cambodia and has relied on a compre-

10.70 in order to better reflect international treaties, agree-

hensive Environmental and Social Impact Assessment.21

ments, frameworks, and the current increased relevance of

This attention to the environment also reflects internation-

environmental concerns. Two examples—Cambodia and

al obligations. Cambodia ratified several international treaties

Croatia—substantiate the importance of the environment in

that all have links to national level planning, including the

mine action and illustrate concrete attempts that have been

National Environmental Action Plan, the National Protected

made by mine action national authorities.

Area Strategic Management Plan, the National Biodiversity
Strategy and Action Plan, and the Cambodia Climate Change

Cambodia

Plan. These treaties implement the United Nations Framework

Cambodia has experienced a rapid rate of deforesta-

Convention on Climate Change as well as Cambodia’s

tion with tree cover loss accelerating faster than in any

National Program to Combat Land Degradation.19 In order

other country in the world. The deforestation has socio-

to mitigate the potential environmental impacts, cooperation

economic consequences and increases national climate

is needed between UNDP, the Cambodian Mine Action and

change vulnerabilities. Cambodia is also home of many pro-

Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), operators, and other

tected areas and endangered species. While mine action often

stakeholders to lower direct and indirect negative environ-

occurs in environmentally sensitive areas, it is important to

mental consequences and threats to cultural resources.

19

take steps to avoid contributing to deforestation and the loss
of biodiversity.
Cambodia’s National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 in-

Croatia

Inclusion of environmental protection in Croatian mine

cludes the goal of ensuring that mine action is “environment

action was the result of top-down and bottom-up process-

protection sensitive.”20 The objective is to mainstream environ-

es. There is a growing awareness of the importance of envi-

mental protection in mine action. The process of developing

ronmental protection and sustainable development by civil
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society. An institutional framework is now in place to advo-

can help make cost-effective choices. IMAS 10.70 should bet-

cate for a higher degree of environmental protection and to

ter capture the need of environmental impact assessments.

gather stakeholders for the management of protected areas at

This would also be in line with ISO 14001. Among other coun-

the county level.

tries, both Croatia and Cambodia are currently successfully

At an early stage, this multi-stakeholder approach—including the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC), the Office
for Mine Action, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of
Environment and Nature Protection, the State Institute for
Nature Protection, the Croatian Forests Company, opera-

lutions to protect the environment.

Raising Awareness

In both Cambodia and Croatia, increased awareness

tors, counties, and park authorities—has created a common

was identified as a fundamental condition for the success-

understanding of the complexity and interconnectedness

ful implementation of environmental protection. Ideally,

among all organizations involved.

raising awareness of environmental protection should take

Croatia does not have a specific national mine action stan-

place at all organizational levels, including both nation-

dard on environment. Instead, CROMAC has developed its

al and international stakeholders, and create a feeling of

own regulations for demining operations building on the ISO

ownership for the population. 22 Awareness raising should

system, particularly ISO 14001. This is in line with the nation-

also identify new partners who could possibly contribute

al demining organizations that follow the ISO 14001 or are

to the mitigation of adverse environmental impacts with

ISO-certified. In fact, ISO 14001 has become a common refer-

capacities or funding.

ence standard for Croatian companies.
When tendering for projects where demining takes place
inside protected nature areas in Croatia, where monitoring is

Improved Management

Improved management can be achieved by establishing en-

conducted by specialized organizations, operators must pro-

vironmental policies and strengthening the importance of the

vide documentation on environmental protection in order to

environment in the tender process (statement of works), stan-

be selected and obtain permission for operation. An addition-

dard operating procedures, monitoring, and training. A re-

al tool to implement mitigation measures is the legal basis of

vised IMAS 10.70, which reflects the ISO 14001 system, would

the National Environmental Protection Act.

be a key tool to improve management. The ISO 14001 points

Enhancing the Protection of the Environment

to strong environmental management by implementing environmentally sensitive policies and strategies. Environmental

The enhancement of the protection of the environment

management systems result in a more systematic and cost-

needs to be closely related to operational requirements. On

effective approach to protect the environment than an ad hoc

this point, mine action can count on IMAS as an instrument

approach.23

to strengthen the sector in mitigating adverse environmental
impacts. The following sections outline a number of points to
be considered in a review of IMAS 10.70 in order to strength-

Increased Coordination

Clearance of landmines and explosive remnants of war

en guidance on environment protection and to ensure that the

(ERW) relates to the environment, is multi-sectoral, and

international frameworks described earlier are better inte-

requires effective coordination and knowledge sharing.

grated into mine action.

Therefore, increased coordination between stakeholders is es-

Environmental Impact Assessments
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implementing environmental assessments to find optimal so-

sential and improves awareness so that appropriate mitigation
measures can be established.

Operational safety is a must in mine action. The protec-

Increased coordination among environmental stakeholders

tion of the environment at times will be at odds with safety

also secures the use of existing capacities, frameworks, and

measures, and balancing these two needs will require coor-

legal acts. Stakeholders would include international, region-

dination and planning among stakeholders. A thorough en-

al, and national environmental organizations, governmental

vironmental impact assessment together with technical and

bodies, NGOs, and academia. Coordination is identified as

non-technical survey can define and establish mitigation

one of the major problems in the humanitarian sector to im-

measures, which lower adverse impacts on the environment

prove relief work and avoid gaps as well as duplicating efforts.

without compromising the safety of operators and cost-

Coordination is thus a fundamental need to make the protec-

effectiveness of operations. Moreover, an impact assessment

tion of the environment cost effective.

FIELD NOTES @ THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

Conclusion

population are not exposed to short- or long-term adverse en-

ate a sustainable future. The 2030 Agenda and the Sendai

the security of those involved in clearance activities.

Improved environmental protection is needed to cre-

Framework embody this need. To integrate both these
frameworks, mine action could benefit by improving its approaches to mitigation of adverse environmental impacts.
Both the Croatia and Cambodia cases illustrate that sus-

vironmental impacts while ensuring cost-effectiveness and
Ultimately, a revised IMAS 10.70 should ensure that mine action programs return the land back as it was before mines
were laid, therein improving livelihoods and a sustainable
use of land.
See endnotes page 63

tainable development is a concern and a reason for the protection of the environment.
Due to the diversity of environments in which mine action takes place, environmental assessment should become
an important and integrated part of the work. Environmental
protection is cross-sectoral, and stakeholders’ coordination
is crucial to address threats to the environment. Different
actors can contribute with their specific expertise to find
solutions that do not compromise the security of staff and costeffectiveness of operations while improving mitigation measures. This is best done by introducing a systematic approach
as is already taking place for other aspects in mine action:
quality assurance, quality control, and land release. A management system targeting the environment can therefore be
integrated into already existing approaches in mine action.
In addition, the importance of promoting awareness toward environmental protection and mitigating adverse impacts among all stakeholders cannot be underestimated.

Martin Jebens
DRM Consultancy
Geologist
Martin Jebens is a specialist in disaster
risk management and geologist at DRMConsultancy, which he founded in 2015. In
addition, he works for the Danish Coastal
Authority. His main focus of work is vulnerability and risk assessments and how to
decrease risks by improving capacities in
planning, coordination, and awareness. In
addition he is taking part in inter-ministerial work groups working
on flood risk management and climate change adaptation. He has
a background as GIS and environmental coordinator in mine action.

Gianluca Maspoli, Ph.D.
Advisor
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining

Environmental mitigation is likely to increase expenses and
should be reflected in the funding due to new demands and
criteria introduced in the mine action sector.
A revised IMAS 10.70 on environment, which builds on
ISO 14001, must address these issues to a higher degree. The
revision should aim to release land so that wildlife and the

Gianluca Maspoli is Policy Advisor at the
GICHD and is responsible for projects
strengthening the linkages of mine action with human security. Prior to joining
the GICHD, Gianluca worked in peacekeeping and peace-building missions. He
holds a doctorate in Political Science from
the University of Geneva.
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Field Notes
Clearing Safe Spaces for Drought
Affected Communities in Somaliland
by Ed Lajoie and Megan Dwyer [ The HALO Trust ]

G

overnments and nongovernmental organizations

to secure the border and establish forward logistics bases for

(NGO) working in the Horn of Africa consistently

resupplying troops in Ethiopia, the Somali National Army

identify conflict and climate change as two primary

(SNA) established a series of military installations ringed by

drivers of insecurity in the region. The HALO Trust’s land-

anti-personnel and anti-tank mines on the border between

mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) clearance in the

Somaliland and Ethiopia. During this time, large amounts of

Republic of Somaliland over the last 19 years has been at the

weapons, ammunition, and military equipment were brought

intersection of these two issues.

into the country. Both Somalia and Ethiopia had been Soviet
client states and received large amounts of military assistance;

History of Conflict in Modern Somaliland

however, with the start of the Ogaden War, the Soviets were

Somaliland is a self-declared independent republic but is

forced to choose sides and decided to back Ethiopia. Eager

not recognized by the United Nations and its member states.

to seize the opportunity to win an ally in the region, the

Located in the northwest region of Somalia, Somaliland bor-

United States stepped in and began supplying war material

ders the semi-autonomous region of Puntland to the east,

to Somalia. This infusion of armaments helped fuel the next

Ethiopia to the south and southwest, Djibouti to the north-

stage of conflict in the country.

west, and the Gulf of Aden to the north. The region that now

By the 1980s, Somaliland was growing disillusioned with

comprises Somaliland was home to various sultanates un-

the Somali Democratic Republic as it was called after Siad

til becoming a British protectorate from 1884 until indepen-

Barre’s 1969 takeover. Power and resources were held dispro-

dence on 26 June 1960. On 1 July 1960, Somaliland reunited

portionately by those in the south, while the north was bearing

with the successor state of Italy’s protectorate in the south to

the burden of the aftereffects of the Ogaden War including an

form the Somali Republic. On 18 May 1991 with the Somali

influx of Somali refugees from the disputed region. The Somali

Republic crumbling, the Republic of Somaliland unilaterally

National Movement (SNM) was founded in 1981 as an orga-

declared its independence and maintains a de facto state to

nization advocating political redress of northern grievanc-

this day.

es but morphed into an all-out revolutionary independence

The majority of the landmine and ERW contamination in

movement by the mid-‘80s as the Somali government sought

Somaliland is the result of three periods of major conflict.

JUL

to eliminate all resistance with increasingly harsh methods.

In 1977, Somali President Siad Barre launched the Ogaden

During this time, which is generally considered part of the

War against regional rival Ethiopia, ostensibly to regain the

Somali Civil War, the SNA continued laying mines to pro-

Ogaden territory of eastern Ethiopia regarded by the Somali

tect its bases and infrastructure from SNM attacks, while the

government as rightfully part of a “greater Somalia.” In order

SNM used landmines to ambush SNA patrols and logistics
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Figure 1. Somaliland seasonal calendar showing the two rainy seasons.
Figure courtesy of Famine Early Warning Systems.
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convoys. Massive amounts of ordnance were deployed by the
SNA on the civilian population of Somaliland, most notably
during the aerial bombing and artillery bombardments of the
cities of Hargeisa and Burao, both of which were almost completely destroyed. When the regime of Siad Barre collapsed in
1991, SNM fighters were able to gain the upper hand as SNA
forces pulled back.
Subsequent to independence, large scale interfactional
clashes occurred in Somaliland as different groups vied for
political power. These clashes included small-scale mine laying, as armed groups sought to establish control of land by denying other groups’ access. The large amounts of weapons and
ammunition remaining from the civil war added to the volatility of an already unstable region.

HALO’s Work in Somaliland

The HALO Trust began operations in Somaliland in 1999,

conducting manual and mechanical mine clearance, battle
area clearance (BAC), explosive ordnance disposal (EOD),
physical security and stockpile management (PSSM), and
mine risk education (MRE). HALO is active in all regions
of Somaliland and, from 1999 to January 2018, has cleared
2,340 hectares of land, removing 3,560 anti-personnel mines,
1,348 anti-tank mines, 101,413 items of unexploded ordnance
(UXO) and stray ammunition, and 150,372 rounds of small
arms ammunition. After almost twenty years of clearance
in Somaliland, HALO is now focusing on finishing the final
large high-priority tasks in the country, mainly former SNA
positions on the border with Ethiopia. If funding levels remain constant and the severity of the drought does not return
to its pre-2018 levels, the clearance of these tasks should be
completed by mid-to-late 2019. During the next year, HALO
will also focus on raising the capacity of the national authorities to deal with the remaining small, low, and medium priority tasks, which mainly consist of isolated roads as well as
the continuing threat posed by UXO and stray ammunition.
HALO’s work in Somaliland is currently funded by generous support from the United Kingdom (DFID), the Office
of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the U.S. State
Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/
WRA), Germany (German Federal Foreign Office), Ireland
(Irish Aid), Finland (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and the
Netherlands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Previous donors include the Norwegian government (Royal Ministry of
Foreign Affairs), Switzerland (Federal Department of Foreign
Affairs/Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)),
Belgium (Federal Government of Belgium), and Canada
(Canada International Development Agency).

Climate Change and Drought

HALO’s clearance work in Somaliland and the overall

development of the country have been heavily impacted by
one of the worst droughts to hit the region in recent history. Somaliland usually experiences rainfall in two seasons
every year: the Gu rainy season from April to July and the
Deyr rainy season from October to January.1 Beginning in
2016 and continuing into 2017, Somaliland experienced a
drought caused by lower than average rainfalls for four consecutive seasons. Throughout October 2017, when seasonal
rains are usually heaviest, rainfall was 50 percent below average.1 Extremely poor harvests caused by this lack of rainfall
along with the death of up to 80 percent of the country’s livestock has plunged the region into crisis conditions as families across the Horn of Africa struggled to survive.2 The loss
of livelihoods and lack of food security displaced many rural
families, pushing them toward populated areas in search of a
support system. In 2017, using data from the United Nations
Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported over 242,000 internally displaced persons (IDP) within
Somaliland.3 However, the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) estimates that the true number of IDPs
in Somaliland may be as high as 1,004,400.4 Although the
Famine Early Warning System reports that the situation has
slightly improved in 2018, much of Somaliland is predicted
to have crisis or emergency levels of food insecurity between
February and May 2018.5

Demining and ERW Clearance
Opens Humanitarian Space

In the first half of 2017, HALO’s operations were heavily af-

fected by the drought as teams could not obtain enough water
to supply remote camps without harming already struggling
communities. Minefields in the worst affected areas were suspended as the teams had to relocate to other tasks closer to
areas with consistent water sources. In the second half of the
year, HALO was able to return to tasks on the border with
Ethiopia and prioritized tasks to include assistance to persons
displaced by the drought. As has been observed in many other
countries, as IDPs move into new and unfamiliar areas that
have mine and ERW risks, they are often at a greater risk of
being injured or killed, especially if they come from an area
without such threats.
In July 2017, an eight-year-old girl in an IDP camp near the
town of Adhi-Adeeye in Sool region found a stray hand grenade in an area adjacent to the camp, which was the scene of
fighting between Puntland and Somaliland forces between
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Figure 2. A map of IDP camp locations in Somaliland as of November 2017 produced by IOM.
Figure courtesy of IOM.
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2004 and 2008. The girl brought the grenade into her family’s

travel to the nearby village of Jeenyo Laaye to use wells there.

cooking area in front of their house and pulled the pin un-

However, these wells are swiftly running dry and causing wa-

aware of the danger of the item. The resulting explosion killed

ter prices to increase from US$2 a barrel in late December to

the girl and wounded 17 others as they were preparing food.

$2.50 a barrel in January 2018, an enormous sum in a country

HALO immediately sent a team to the area to conduct BAC

where the average income per person is less than $1 per day.

and EOD activities, as well as the MRE team to conduct educa-

HALO’s current task in Khaatumo is to clear the road be-

tion seminars with the civilians. HALO found and destroyed

tween Khaatumo and Jeenyo Laaye, freeing up access for IDPs

23 items of UXO and stray ammunition, while six additional

and villagers alike. Clearing the 18 km (11.2 mi) route will

UXO items were handed over by the surrounding community.

save beneficiaries a significant amount of time and effort in

As refugees move toward populated areas, land previ-

accessing the water source at Jeenyo Laaye, as they are cur-

ously cleared by HALO has been repurposed to serve IDPs

rently forced to travel 38 km (23.6 mi) through detours and

as a safe area to set up camp, as was the case near the vil-

side roads.

lage of Khaatuumo. Khaatumo village is located on the bor-

HALO’s work to open roads is also important to the safe-

der with Ethiopia and was heavily mined during both the

ty of economic migrants as was recently demonstrated by an

Ogaden War (1977–1978) and Somali Civil War (1988–1991)

accident in the Lughaya area. On 21 January 2018, a dual-wheel

to protect military camps and prevent road access. HALO

flatbed truck carrying approximately 30 people detonated an

cleared over 750,000 sq m (896,992.5 sq yd) of ground

anti-tank mine on a track 12 km (7.5 mi) south of Lughaya, a

around a former military camp between 2014 and 2015,

town of 14,000 inhabitants in Northwest Somaliland. The pas-

finding and destroying 57 anti-personnel and four anti-

sengers in the vehicle were economic migrants trying to reach

tank mines. The area now houses two IDP camps for people

a boat in Lughaya town in order to travel abroad in search of

displaced by drought.

work. Fortunately, due to the mine’s depth and standoff pro-

The arrival of IDPs in Khaatumo has increased the pres-

vided by boxes that the passengers were standing on, only two

sure on local water sources. The villagers in Khaatumo rely on

people were slightly injured. With ever-growing numbers of

limited water supplies from local wells, while the IDPs must

displaced persons passing through Somaliland from Ethiopia
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Figure 3. The green circles on the map indicate minefields cleared by The HALO Trust. The red circles depict remaining road
tasks, while the squares represent former military camp positions. Note the significant overlap with the IDP camp map.
Figure courtesy of The HALO Trust.

to access the coast for the purpose of economic migration, the

Nearly 60 percent of deprived households in Somaliland

threat of landmines is a daily hazard and one that carries sig-

rely on livestock to sustain their livelihoods.6 Somalis are fa-

nificant impacts.

mously adept pastoralists and rely heavily on livestock not

Conclusion

only for their milk and meat, but also as an investment. In
an environment where banking and savings facilities are lim-

Since the beginning of the drought in 2016, HALO’s clear-

ited, livestock, particularly camels, represent a key alterna-

ance teams have released 134,000 sq m (160,262.7 sq yd) of

tive. The loss of camels, when one steps on an anti-tank mine

land for agricultural use such as growing fruit, vegetables,

and kills several in a herd, can destroy the wealth of not only

and cereal as well as grazing land for livestock. In addition,
156,000 sq m (186,574.4 sq yd) of land has been cleared for
community development, and 986,000 sq m (1,179,256.2 sq yd)
of land has been cleared to allow access for water collection,
health facilities, schools, markets, and other aspects of livelihood previously cut off by the threat of landmines.
The activities conducted by HALO provide support to
urban and rural communities that have a history of conflict
or that have been severely impacted by the drought. Clan
disputes in Somaliland are often centered on agricultural land
and access to resources such as water. By clearing mined land,
HALO improves access to these resources, reducing the likelihood of disputes arising, which in turn has a stabilizing
effect on the region and the country.

Locals returning from a watering point pass by the Jeenyo Laaye
minefield in Somaliland.
Photo courtesy of The HALO Trust.
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Figure 4. HALO completed EOD tasks in Somaliland.
Figure courtesy of The HALO Trust.

single families but often the wider community. In addition to
the prevention of accidents to people, the prevention of accidents to livestock is also an important outcome.
HALO also recruits staff from local communities, and
with over 500 local nationals employed in Somaliland, the
injection of money into local economies through salaries is
significant. In areas where there are few other income alternatives, this approach has a proven stabilization effect on
the entire country.
The humanitarian situation in Somaliland significantly
deteriorated in 2017, as several seasons of poor and belowaverage rainfall impacted food security and livelihoods,
and the situation is expected to deteriorate further in 2018.
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) stated that
rural livelihoods are people’s best defence against famine,
and HALO intends to continue supporting these livelihoods
through opening access to resources and protecting lives
and property.7
See endnotes page 63
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Field Notes
DETERMINING THE VALUE
OF UAVS IN IRAQ
by Bradley Alford, Ed Curran, and Shawn Cole [ Janus Global Operations ]

A

s areas of Iraq and Syria controlled by ISIS are liber-

the UAV (e.g., a video feed, battery data, and flight teleme-

ated, internally displaced persons (IDP) are returning

try). Regulations and definitions vary around the world, but

to their homes to face widespread destruction and con-

a small UAV is generally considered to weigh 20 kg (44 lbs)

tamination from deadly improvised explosive devices (IED)
implanted by ISIS to maim, kill, and terrorize. Janus Global
Operations (Janus) currently operates throughout Iraq, clearing IEDs with a focus on bringing critical infrastructure online to allow IDPs to return safely and resume their lives.

or less.

Utiliz ing UAV Technology in Iraq

A UAV that supports search, improvised explosive device

disposal (IEDD), and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) op-

Operating in urban environments has proven challenging

erations in Iraq is a force multiplier. It is a defining tool for de-

due to the high volume of destroyed buildings and associated

ploying limited resources, such as equipment and manpower,

rubble. In urban environments, operators are exposed to un-

directly to a hazardous area with minimal risk and maximum

certain situations when traditional detection methods can be

target intelligence. The surveillance data can be appraised

dangerous. Among the primary goals of industry best practic-

and the correct assets employed, enabling operations to com-

es is to protect operators by limiting their exposure to explo-

mence in a timely manner.

sive remnants of war, including IEDs. In a destroyed factory,
small copper crush wires, which ISIS has used extensively for
victim-activated IEDs, can be difficult to detect, and expos-

Equipment Used for UAV Operations

UAV prices have fallen dramatically, and are now accessi-

ing operators to this threat is unacceptable. Situations like

ble to most audiences. Current prices range from small chil-

this drive new innovations in search and clearance operation-

dren’s toys that can be purchased for under US$100 to larger

al technology to protect operators by more safely finding and

hobbyist machines designed to provide high-quality visual

disrupting IEDs.

data that can cost thousands. Janus chose the DJI Phantom

Operator safety and operational quality are Janus’ two pri-

4 Pro (P4P) for use in Iraq due to its local availability as

mary goals. To augment the successful outcomes of our oper-

well as the rigorous environmental field testing that has al-

ations and to further mitigate the risk to our operators, Janus

ready been conducted by the manufacturer and independent

has been testing the validity of adopting unmanned aerial ve-

technology evaluators to validate the system’s ruggedness.

hicles (UAV), or drones, to assist in search and clearance op-

The P4P is a small quadcopter aircraft that carries a high-

erations. This article discusses the results from our extensive

definition (HD) camera, stabilized on a three-axis (roll, pitch,

field testing.

and yaw) gimbal, and is capable of recording video and still

What is a UAV?

images. The P4P weighs approximately 1.4 kg (3.0 lbs) and has
a maximum quoted flight time of approximately 30 minutes

A UAV, commonly referred to as a drone, is an aircraft

per battery, with a transmission range of 5–7 km (3.1–4.3 mi).

without a human pilot onboard. Small UAVs are components

The UAV has a maximum range of 500 m (546.8 yd) horizon-

of small unmanned aircraft systems (SUAS), which includes

tally and 121.9 m (133.3 yards) vertically, or the operator’s

a UAV, a ground-based operator, and a system of communi-

visual range. The UAV can fly intelligently, and has anti-colli-

cation between the two. The communication is achieved via

sion sensors (front, rear, below, and on the port and starboard

a radio control unit that incorporates a transmitter (Tx) for

planes), which the pilot may use or turn off as necessary. The

commanding the UAV and a receiver for receiving data from

UAV streams a live video feed to the Tx, which is either viewed
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The results from observing the pressure plate and crush
wire IEDs suggest that an initial flight plan should have a significant UAV height in order to search for associated ground
signs first (with buried main charges likely providing the
most easily-recognized indicator of potential contamination).
Ground signs can include indicators such as disturbed earth,
sight line markers, and tamping. After a potential target is
located, a closer and detailed look can be taken for potential
switches. Whereas ground signs may indicate the presence of
a buried pressure plate, the absence of ground sign coming
from a located main charge may indicate the presence of a
crush wire as the initiator. Finally, a detailed slow and low
DJI Phantom 4 Pro (P4P) Quadcopter.

a setting that significantly slows down the P4P but allows for

by an attached phone or tablet, or in the case of the P4P Plus

the quality of imagery. This is best done from four differing

model, a dedicated first-person view (FPV) screen on the Tx.
The camera has the capability to record up to Ultrahigh
Definition (4K) at 60 frames per second, but video is typically
streamed at 1080p full HD or 720p HD if the feed is weakened.
It is possible to take photographs while video is being recorded
by pressing specific buttons on the Tx or by touching specific
icons on the FPV touchscreen.
The P4P’s sale is strictly limited to international agencies
and is available for $1,400–1,900. Replacement parts are available through a specific retailer in Erbil, and can be expected
within 10–20 days of request. The ease of purchasing and using UAVs has, however, also been recognized by terror groups
as well as government security forces in Iraq. Thus, the sale of
drones and the areas where they can fly are now regulated in
Iraq. To use UAV technology in Iraq, each site requires a general letter of authority to fly from the local mayor or police/
army commander, and it is advisable to notify Iraqi security
force commanders and civilian authorities in the vicinity of

more precise control and smoother video footage to increase
cardinal points across the area of concern. The height and angle of the sun may help or hinder UAV optics and, to achieve
the highest visibility, multiple approaches from differing angles should be made.
The UAV performed well in large, open-plan storage units,
but anti-collision algorithms prevented it from entering conventional doorways without disabling this safety mechanism.
DJI has produced a smaller UAV product, the Spark, which retails for approximately $750 and is a quarter of the P4P’s size:
20 cm (7.8 in) in length. The Spark appears to excel in tight
and confined conditions and still has a stabilized HD camera
onboard. The only limiting factor is a flight time of 16 minutes. The associated amount of hovering involved with flying
in a confined area will reduce the flight time. Currently, the
P4P is still a preferable option due to its durability and skilled
pilots can compensate for disabled safety mechanisms.
We found that a profound parallax effect occurs when attempting to fly a UAV over a target more than 200 m (218 yd)

operational sites of planned UAV flights.

away.1 In order to negate this, missions should be supported

Evaluation Parameters and Testing

lots should have at least five-to-eight hours of flight training

Janus conducted a trial and evaluation (T&E) in Iraq to as-

sess the effectiveness of UAV support to operations, utilizing
a P4P Plus. The T&E took place in four typical environments:
area search, buildings, warehouses, and routes. Trip wires,
crush wires, pressure plates, and concealed IEDs were prepared and emplaced in these environments to prove the concept and to test the feasibility and capabilities of the onboard
camera and FPV screen. The optimal operating distance of the
P4P was gathered as a result of the testing.

Testing Results and Best Practices
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sweep of the area should be made in Tripod Mode, which is

Courtesy of Shawn Cole, Task Order Leader, Janus Global Operations
LLC.
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by a range finder and at least one pair of binoculars. UAV pibefore supporting live operations. This allows the operator to
develop muscle memory, dexterity, familiarity with the aircraft, and patience in order to become sufficiently proficient
with the SUAS to ensure a successful outcome.
All video footage should be recorded in 4K/2.7K resolution.2 At this level of resolution the quality of the video imagery is sufficiently high to pause and capture high resolution
screenshots directly from the video playback. During operations, a detail can be spotted on a laptop monitor (not previously seen by the UAV operator), and the possibility exists

Tests of the UAV were conducted inside a small and confined building.
Courtesy of Shawn Cole, Task Order Leader, Janus Global Operations LLC.

to capture it, export it, add digital filters, and zoom. With

From our testing, Janus believes that there would be many

1080p/720p resolution, the results are less defined and crucial

benefits to adding UAVs to the inventory of IEDD/EOD teams.

detail could be missed.

Their use would enhance capability, safety, and speed and are

Further tests were conducted using the UAV inside a small
and confined building. The camera on the P4P is central on
the vertical plane running through the middle of the UAV.
However, it is offset on the central horizontal plane and sits
below the central line. This made the assessment of the drone
location when flying through entrances with limited clearance while utilizing the FPV screen awkward. After flying
into a building, the GPS signal that the UAV uses to maintain position can be blocked. The UAV then reverts to utilizing the visual sensors on the bottom of the UAV body to hold
position while hovering. Unfortunately, this only works with
ample light available. Tripod Mode had to be used to delay the
UAV movements and maintain maximum control inside the
building. Any future attempts should incorporate the use of
propeller guards. In a confined space, if flying low or moving
through a window gap, turbulence is created from the rotors
that results in the UAV drifting, making it difficult to control.
If a propeller hits an obstacle, such as a door frame, then the
UAV will likely crash, possibly be damaged and need recovering, which defeats the point of using the UAV.

Benefits to Using UAV Technology

summarized as but not limited to being capable of:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Area reduction.
Confirmation of explosive hazard (EH) contamination.
Establishing target patterns and direction.
Investigating ground signs on operational sites.
Non-technical and technical survey support.
Observation in restricted access areas.
Protective security detail surveillance (e.g., vehicle
breakdowns in hostile areas).
Reconnaissance prior to entering previous work sites
after a security incident.
Remote reconnaissance of viable IEDs.
Render Safe Procedure (RSP) confirmation.
Route checks.
Support for mechanical assets.
Target confirmation.
Up-to-date imagery of operational task sites for:

• Briefings
• Reporting
Limitations to Using UAV Technology

While UAVs have proven to be invaluable tools for both
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humanitarian and military operations, our tests indicate that

During the trial, an entry-level UAV—the P4P Plus—was

they do have the following limitations/complications in appli-

used, primarily utilized by hobbyists. DJI (and many oth-

cation of IEDD search:

er UAV manufacturers) have systems that are capable of

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Battery endurance (average 20 minutes flight time).

even more applications. These UAVs can carry small pay-

Flying ability of the UAV operator.

loads and have greater f light endurance, better cameras,

Flying over busy highways and roads.

and thermal imaging as standard. While the trial UAV was

Flying over densely populated areas.

robust and performed well, the fixed FPV screen prevented

Flying through small gaps and inside buildings.

third-party software from being used.

Authority to fly locally (government/police/military).

As UAV costs continue to decline, getting these inexpen-

Nighttime flying.

sive tools into the hands of trained operators across the

Public perception – these camera platforms can be con-

world will evolve procedures and standards, and help miti-

fused with weapons.

gate operator risk. As UAVs are used more broadly for

Proximity to airports and air traffic.

IEDD/EOD operations, more innovative UAV solutions will

Visibility

be crafted that address the current limitations, leading to

Weather conditions (rain and electrical storms).

greater efficiency, economy, and operator safety.
See endnotes page 63

Wind speeds in excess of 17 km/hr.

Technology Limitation Mitigations

A UAV operation can be time consuming, and sufficient

battery power must be included for each mission. Each P4P
battery has a maximum listed life span of 30 minutes; however, during testing, it was found to be closer to 20–25 minutes.
The automatic low-battery level is signaled to the UAV operator once the battery level descends below 30 percent. If the
warning is not heeded, an autonomous function takes control
of the UAV and flies it back to its original take-off position.
Each mission should have at least three fully-charged batteries on-site in addition to a main charger or a vehicle charger.
Thermal imaging cameras are now available for the DJI
P4P UAV platform. These retail at approximately $2,500 and
would significantly increase the effectiveness of the UAV.

Bradley Alford
Janus Global Operations, LLC
High Threat Integrated Tracking Specialist
Bradley Alford works for Janus Global
Operations in support of Diplomatic
Security operations abroad. He previously
worked for Janus on the U.S. Department
of State conventional weapons destruction programs in Afghanistan, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Iraq, and Laos. He has lived in
Morocco, where he studied Arabic through
the U.S. Department of Defense’s Project Global Officer Program.
He also worked as a research intern for the NATO Defense College
in Rome. Alford holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Affairs
with a concentration in the Middle East.

When flown in Tripod Mode over large areas, fresh anomalies
are easily spotted, subtle differences in temperatures are easily distinguishable, landmines, IEDs, VS-500 IED mines, and
items of ERW will all hold temperature values that differ from
the mean ground temperature and, as such, are easily spotted
from height despite being concealed.

Conclusion

The use of UAV technology to support IEDD/EOD op-

erations in Iraq has increased Janus’ overall effectiveness in
Iraq. The relatively small cost of implementing UAVs into
the respective areas of operations and integrating them into
daily operations has the potential to render large benefits.
By training more UAV operators and integrating thermal
imaging cameras into the UAV platform, Janus plans to further develop the capability of this technology for IEDD/
EOD operations.
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Ed Curran
Janus Global Operations, LLC
Project Intel Support Officer
Edward J. Curran III graduated from James
Madison University in December 2017 with
a B.S. in Public Policy and Administration
and a concentration in Management. Prior
to attending James Madison, Curran served
in the United States Marine Corps as an
all-source intelligence analyst. He deployed to Musa Qalah with Kilo Company,
3d Battalion 2d Marines in 2011 and gained experience in counter
IED operations. He deployed again aboard the USS Kearsarge with
the 26 Marine Expeditionary Unit in 2013. Curran later worked after his graduation from James Madison as the Project Intel Support
Officer in support of Janus’ Conventional Weapons Destruction
(CWD) Program in Iraq.

Shawn Cole
Janus Global Operations, LLC
Task Order Leader
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WHY IS WATER SO EFFICIENT AT SUPPRESSING
THE EFFECTS OF EXPLOSIONS?
by Stephen Salter [ University of Edinburgh ] and John Parkes
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Figure 1. The speed of sound in mixtures of water and air as a function of the water/air ratio.
All graphics courtesy of the authors.

W

hen most experienced explosives engineers first observe an
explosion suppressed by bags of water, they are convinced
that there has been a misfire. Depending on the amount
of water and the way it is contained, the overpressure can be reduced
by a factor of ten, sometimes more than twenty.1 The number of fragments from shell cases can be one hundred times less. Their velocities
can be seven times. Slugs from focal point charges are stopped. Safety
distances around magazines can be cut. The number of people evacuated from a bomb disposal site can be reduced. In June 1999, engineers
from 33 Regiment (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) saved an entire village in Kosovo from the detonation of a 2,000-pound NATO bomb by
using water bags.
This article outlines some of the physics behind the effects. Latent
heat, fast external pressure rise, drag of fragments, momentum transfer, the speed of sound in gas-liquid mixtures, and interference with the
combustion of carbon are all involved, but perhaps other mysteries still
remain. Some practical details of the technique are also discussed.
HEAT
The latent heat needed to evaporate a kilogram of water is 2.25 megajoules. The explosive energy from 1 kilogram of TNT is 4.45 megajoules.
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Water is cheap and can be affordably placed weighing much more than
twice its weight in explosives. An explosion breaks water into a fine
spray. The surface area of spray is six times the water volume divided
by drop diameter and can be very large. For example, a cubic meter of
water broken into 30 micron drops has a surface area of 200,000 square
meters. This large area provides a splendid chance for evaporation. The
exact rate of heat transfer cannot be known without knowledge of the
distribution of drop diameters and their velocities relative to the surrounding hot gases. However, by making reasonable guesses, one can
show that all the heat can be transferred to water drops in times of the
order of a few milliseconds. Cooling the products of an explosion by ten
times on the absolute temperature scale will give correspondingly large
reductions in the pressure and volume of gases.
SOUND SPEED
The speed of sound in any medium is given by dividing the bulk modulus by the density and taking the square root. (The bulk modulus of
a substance indicates how hard it is to reduce its volume by increasing
pressure and is the ratio of an applied pressure to the resulting fractional change in volume.) Water at 15 degrees Celsius has a rather high
bulk modulus of 2.05 x 109 newton per square meter and a density of
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Figure 2. Fragment number and velocity from pairs of 155 mm M107 howitzer shells.

999 kilogram per cubic meter, giving it a speed of sound of 1,432 meters
per second. At the frequencies of sound and explosive waves, the bulk
modulus of a gas is given by its pressure times the ratio of its specific
heat at constant pressure and constant volume. This ratio is often given
the symbol γ with the value 1.4 for diatomic gasses like air. The density
of ambient air is about 1.22 kilogram per cubic meter giving it a speed of
sound of 341 meters per second.
The speed of sound in a mixture of water and air is very interesting.
A fifty-fifty mixture by volume would have double the bulk modulus of
air (i.e., 283,640 newton per squared meter) and half the density of water
(i.e., 499.5 kilogram per cubic meter).2 This mixture would have a speed
of sound of only 23.8 meters per second, a factor of 17 down on normal
speed in waterless air. Figure 1 shows a graph of the speed of sound in
water/air mixtures as a function of water-to-air fraction. The effect is
very strong for ratios between 0.03 and 0.97.
A video sequence of a water-suppressed explosion shows that the
rate of advance of the spray front is very close to the velocities shown
in Figure 1.
MOMENTUM TRANSFER
The conical geometry of a focal point charge can produce a slug of
metal moving with a velocity that is considerably above the detonation
velocity of the best explosives. The velocity is so high that a very thick
armor plate can be penetrated. However, when such a projectile hits two
bags of water, about the dimensions of a pillow, hanging on an easel
made of domestic, hollow-core doors, the entire mass of water is blown
out from the far side of the furthest pillow. Suppose that a slug weighing 0.1 kilogram is approaching the target at 10,000 meters per second.
The momentum is 1,000 kilogram meters per second. This has to be conserved. When the slug hits the front wall of a water bag, a positive pressure wave with a spherical front propagates through the water. When
this reaches the far side of the bag, there is an impedance mismatch because the mechanical properties of air and water are so different. This
results in the reflection of the positive pressure wave as a negative front,
but a liquid cannot sustain large negative pressures. The result is that
water sprays out from the entire area of shock front. The process is repeated for the second bag.
If the momentum of the slug is transferred to a 100 kilogram mass of
water, the water velocity needed to accept the momentum will be only
10 meters per second. The water behaves like the executive desktop toy
known as Newton’s cradle, which consists of a set of steel balls on pairs
of strings swinging in a row. The intact slug in the shape of a carrot will

be found very close to the easel position. Protection works because the
expanding shock front transfers momentum to all the water.
FRAGMENT DRAG
Imagine that a steel munition case round has just exploded. The enormous internal pressure causes cracks to appear between the munition’s
case and the neighboring fragment at places chosen by the shell designer
to produce the most damaging effect. A much lower pressure outside the
casing and the large pressure difference means that the case has to do
some serious acceleration. Meanwhile, explosive gases with a high density under the same pressure gradient are pouring through the gap between the case and the neighboring fragments giving high aerodynamic
drag forces to increase acceleration even further. The casing’s shape is
such that it will probably have a high drag coefficient.
Now imagine that the event is repeated with a large mass of water
touching the outer wall of the case. As soon as the cracks open, the pressure in the water outside rises very fast and quickly approaches the pressure inside. With no pressure gradient, why should the munition bother
to do any acceleration? The water from the outside of the enclosing bags
can do it instead. Drops of water are held together by surface tension
but movement relative to surrounding air creates a force to break them
apart. This continues until they are very small and moving with almost
the same velocity as the mixture of air and explosion products around
them. If the water packing around the charge was incomplete and the
round did acquire some velocity relative to the water around the munition case, the drag forces will be 800 times higher than if it were moving through air.
Parkes, Wilkinson, and O’Dwyer did experiments on howitzer shells
at the Defence Research Agency (DRA) range at Shoeburyness using
extremely sophisticated equipment for measuring fragment numbers
and velocity. The results from two unsuppressed events at 6.05 meters range and two suppressed events at 4.5 meters range are shown in
Image 1.3 The fragment screens intercept only a small fraction (1.95%
and 3.54% respectively) of the total number of fragments produced by
the shell casing but, with an unsuppressed detonation, still enough to
be statistically significant.
For both the unsuppressed shells, the velocity distribution shows
three distinct clusters between 600 and 800 meters per second for reasons so far unexplained. The two shells produced a total of 186 fragments. However, even with a higher interception angle, there was only
one fragment recorded from each of the suppressed events and both
the velocities were about 100 meters per second. There were water bags
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PRACTICAL STRUCTURES
Suppression has now been tested with a wide
range of charge weights and weapon casings up
to a Mk 84 Paveway bomb with a 2,000 pound
charge. Most of the practical work involves
making a structure that can contain and support a large weight of water without itself generating dangerous fragments. The experiments
show that it is wrong to try to contain water
in any structure that itself might tend to contain the explosion or to interfere with the outward movement of spay. Achieving intimate
contact between explosion products and water
as quickly as possible is ideal. Water bags made
from layflat polyethylene tube are satisfactory provided that the welding is given careful
attention. Even with a thickness of 250 microns, they are sufficiently strong. A fit, rugbyplaying Royal Logistics Corps major wearing
steel-tipped combat boots could viciously attack
a water-filled bag to no effect. Similarly, a tugof-war team could drag a filled bag over rough
A pair of water bags mounted on a chip-board easel. The HB 876 has a self-forging fragment that is abgravel without consequence.
solutely lethal and designed to knock out bulldozers as they attempt to fill in bomb craters on runways.
An uneven thickness of water allows more
The weapon functions when tipped over and sends the self-forging fragment through the bulldozer
blade, engine, and the operator. The weapon carries many smaller “pea charges” for AP effect. In the
ejecta along the direction of the thinner covertrial, the fragment was actually shattered and its pieces were recovered from the ground at the foot of
ing, hence a spherical water volume should be
the range’s safety blocks. No damage was occasioned to the blocks. Self-forging fragments are used in
centered around the charge. A more practical
many roadside bombs and kill tanks and armored vehicles (and their crews) with ease.
hemispherical covering over a ground charge
will increase ground shock, but this could perhaps be reduced by a suraround and above the shell but not below it. It is possible that the fragrounding ditch. The key problem has been to build water bag structures
ments that escaped had moved downwards and bounced off the ground.
with height. It is possible to draw systems in which the skin tension deThe base plate of an artillery shell must be thick enough to withstand the
fines the shape but it is difficult to control the shape of a partly filled
high breech pressure, and there are accounts of intact base plates being
structure. A water bag can roll down imperceptible slopes, and the inthrown over the heads of observers 1,800 meters away from a shell burst.
completely filled structures can show maddening behavior. Expanded
In the Shoeburyness trials, broken base plates from 155 to 200 mm suppolystyrene foam, glass-fiber tubes in the form of hollow rectangular
pressed shells were found at the foot of the 18 millimeter plywood support of the velocity sensing screens.
Anyone who wishes to repeat the experiment but is not in possession
of their own 155 mm howitzer shells and fragment-counting equipment
can build a stockade out of four sheets of hardboard and cover a charge
with a bag of granite chips from a garden center. Examination of the
boards after firing will show many hundreds of penetrations. However
with a 200 millimeter thickness of water bags above the granite chips
there will not be a single penetration of the hardboard screens, and so
the second part of the experiment can safely be tried at home.
CARBON COMBUSTION
Many explosives, TNT in particular, do not contain enough oxygen
to react with all the other molecules. Consequently, an explosion generates a surplus of carbon in the form of a cloud of finely divided soot.
Some of the energy in the soot cloud can still be useful if the carbon can
take oxygen from air and act like a fuel-air explosion. This means that
a negative oxygen balance is not regarded as a disadvantage. Alford has
pointed out that the presence of water drops, water vapor, and lower
temperatures could interfere with the secondary carbon-oxygen reaction.4 This could provide yet another way for water to affect explosions.
Evidence for this is that TNT explosions that have been suppressed
leave behind sooty water but relatively clean air. There are many electrostatic effects going on in an explosion and over short distances the
forces between small, charged particles can be very strong. The water
spray from a suppressed explosion is effective at trapping the dust from
a building demolition.
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Image 2. Saddle bag and polystyrene construction.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT @ THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

beams, cling-film, nets, and the cheapest domestic doors with an internal paper honeycomb filling placed edge on are all suitable supports because they disintegrate into very light particles. Boyer et al. developed a
neat basket made from geo-textile mat shaped like a hat with a high rim
to support water bags and replicated the Shoeburyness trials with grenades and mortar shells.5
For larger structures, Dell Explosives laid duplex water bags so that
they straddled a block of expanded polystyrene like saddle-bags over a
horse and then filled each bag through a hole at the top. The arrangement is shown in Image 2. This method allows walls with overlapping
bags and an airspace between them. Roofs can be made by laying saddlebags over thin-walled, rectangular-section hollow tubes that are long
enough to act as roof beams. The combination of walls and roofs allows
the construction of habitats in which large weapons can be made safe in
the knowledge that any unintended, high-order event (which occurs at
about 10% of disposals) will be safely contained within a much shorter
evacuation distance than required for an unsuppressed explosion.
While fragment stopping suggests that complete water coverage is desirable close to a weapon casing, the reduction of the speed of sound in
water/air mixtures suggests that it might be useful to include some air
deliberately in the outer region of the water volume. Polyethylene bubble pack can be used but has an inconveniently large buoyancy. The most
satisfactory construction for walls, now supplied by Dell Explosives,
uses bales of straw cased in polythene bags made from layflat polythene
tubing. The unfilled bales are very light, far lighter than filled sandbags,
so that structures are quick to build around objects like the bases of
wind turbines. Holes for water pipes are then stabbed through the upper surface of each wrapped bale to allow filling from a hose. Each bale
can hold 100 kilograms of water. Additional structural integrity can be
obtained by wrapping the walls with a belt of cling film. There is the
further advantage that while it is tedious to clean up thousands of fragments of expanded polystyrene after a suppressed explosion, the straw
residues are biodegradable. More permanent structures for long-term
storage of explosives in crowded sites can be made from polystyrene
with water-filled polythene inserts.
For the many hundreds of thousands of suppressions needed for
the disposal of surplus munitions, even the consumption of polythene
would be undesirable. A team at the University of Edinburgh designed
and carried out initial, small-scale testing of water mortars resembling
giant water pistols driven by compressed air that would be placed in a
ring around a charge. Twenty tonnes of water would converge from all
directions just as the charge was fired and the cycle would be repeated
every few minutes.
CONCLUSIONS
Water bags are now in service for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
and civilian demolition adjacent to valuable installations. The reduction
in safety distances and evacuation numbers can provide large savings.
Water suppresses explosions by the
• Rapid cooling of explosion products because of the large surface
area of spray.
• Reduction of sound velocity in water/air mixtures to a few tens of
meters per second.
• Transfer of the momentum of a fast projectile to the entire water
mass.
• Rapid rise of pressure on the outside of a fragmenting weapon
casing.
• Increase of drag of fragments in water because of its higher density.
• Suppression of soot combustion in low-oxygen explosives.
To put numerical values on the possible factors listed above, researchers should measure the number, velocity, temperature, and sizedistribution of drops inside the expanding water-air mix.

Structures to contain water must not impede the rapid mixing of
water and gasses. They must not themselves present any fragmentation
hazard. Achieving height is the chief difficulty.
Polythene bags, expanded polystyrene foam, low-density domestic
doors, nets, geo-textile baskets, hollow glass-reinforced plastic (GRP)
tubes, and straw bales in polythene are all suitable materials.
Water and straw are cheap, rapid to erect with small teams, and biodegradable. For the continuous, production-line suppression needed
for disposal of unused weapons, large volumes of spray can be generated by water mortars.
The authors hope that water and water bags with the right supporting structures will make life for both civilian and military explosives
engineers much less exciting.
See endnotes page 63
As presented at the UK Explosives Mitigation Workshop, RCMS
Shrivenham, 19 June 2002.
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John Parkes
John Parkes joined the British army in 1963 at
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CWD

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STABILIZATION AND RECOVERY
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International Law
• Conventional Weapons
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• Victim Assistance

The Global CWD Repository benefits both the
field and your organization!
The repository is a free, publicly accessible document
storage and sharing tool for material related to conventional weapons destruction and mine action. It will also serve as a
means to preserve the valuable history of mine action and CWD
efforts for future practitioners and researchers.

Submitting materials is simple:
• Easy-to-use online form, includes searchable abstract,
authors and keywords
• Upload a PDF or Microsoft Word document (scanned
documents saved as PDFs are acceptable)
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http:/jmu.edu/cisr/research/cwd-repository.shtml
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ENDNOTES
PPE Development and Needs in HMA by Smith [ from page 5]
1.

NATO Standardization Agency (STANAG) 2920 PPS (edition 2) Ballistic test method for Personal Armor Materials and Combat Clothing, NSA/0723-PPS/2920, 2003.

2.

The author has tested 5mm untreated polycarbonate using NATO STANAG 2920 and found a V50 ranging from 250 m/s to 280 m/s. The uncertain result is probably
caused by variations in the ambient temperature or in the temperature of the fragments (which were fired using blanks or by compressed air).

3.

Hand-tools are included in IMAS 10.30 PPE because the accident record shows that the use of well designed tools can protect the deminer by distance and by avoiding
parts of the tool separating and causing injury.

4.

PURE is a polypropylene self-reinforced composite material: see http://www.ditweaving.com/

5.

This visor was designed by the author and given freely to the manufacturer: See: Security Devices. “SD Platinum Visor.” Accessed 12 April 2018. https://bit.ly/2vghH7B.

6.

The author was invited to advise during a workshop in Norway at the start of the design process for this mask, but does not like the result. For information about the
mask, see: Rofi: Protecting People. Accessed 12 April 2018. https://bit.ly/2vghUrp.

7.

European Committee for Standardization (CEN) Workshop Agreement 15756, now defunct.

8.

IMAS 10.30, 2nd Edition, amendment 2, “References to CWA for T&E of PPE were removed from Clause1 and Annex A” at the start of 2011.

9.

The author was an advisor to the project.

10. From IMAS 04.10, Glossary, 2014. This definition is drawn from the International Standards Organization (ISO) Guide 51:1999(E).
11. Left to right, the pictures show a UNADP deminer in Mozambique a HALO Trust and a MAG deminer in Cambodia.
12. Pictures taken in 2017 during specialist IED clearance training conducted in Syria by PCM ERW Risk Management & MAT Kosovo. www.pcm-erw.com, email: info@
pcm-erw.com.
13. Lebanon NMAS 04.10 Glossary, February, 2018.
14. Drafted by the LMAC with the author’s input, 2018.
15. The most successful of which in terms of sales is the DOK-ING MV4 made in Croatia (which has also supplied U.S. forces in Afghanistan).
16. IMAS 10.30 PPE, Edition 1, 2001. “The frontal protection ensemble provided to employees, whether required to kneel, sit or squat shall be designed to cover the eyes,
throat (frontal neck), chest, abdomen and genitals”.
17. IMAS 10.30 2nd Edition, 2008.
18. As a member of the IMAS Review Board, the author argued for this change because of the lack of injuries sustained while wearing goggles while excavating with rakes.
The wearing of blast goggles during EOD and IED tasks has since become common, which was not anticipated but the author respects the principle of wearer’s choice
as long as blast visors are available at the task if they choose to wear them.
19. For a formal HMA Field Risk Assessment training course, the author recommends the one that he provided some materials for at GICHD. Contact: r.evans@gichd.org
20. Database of Demining Accidents, which is an informative reference in IMAS 10.30, (Annex A) and online at www.ddasonline.com.
21. International Mine Action Standards Technical Note for Mine Action (IMAS TNMA) TN 10.20 20 2009.
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